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return to capital? Why does a country’s rate of return to capital remain high in spite of a high investment rate? 
 
The cornerstones of the model are heterogeneity in productivity, reallocation of resources and asymmetric financial imperfections. 
The enterprise sector is divided into private and state-owned enterprises. Private enterprises are more productive, but due to the 
discrimination by the financial sector they must rely on internal savings, while state-owned enterprises are less productive, but 
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composition effect. 
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assets by the financial intermediaries causing the foreign surplus to increase. After the transition is over, the economy is 
dominated by private enterprises and capital accumulation is subject to diminishing return to capital. 
 
The main contradictions with China’s experience are frictionless labor market, financial market laissez-faire environment and the 
prediction that state-owned enterprises fully fades from the economy. Despite of these simplifications, the model gives a clear 
qualitative explanation to China’s puzzling phenomena of sustained return to capital and growing foreign surplus. The 
simplifications allow the model to focus on the main differences between E and F firms, that is to say the heterogeneity in 
productivity and asymmetric financial imperfections. 
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𝜃  The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 𝑐𝑡 
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𝛼  The output elasticity of capital 
                                                 
1 For simplicity: the time subscripts are omitted from the list of notations. In general, the 
time subscripts used in the model are period 𝑡, past period 𝑡 − 1, next period 𝑡 + 1, and 
period at the end of the transition 𝑇. Moreover, without few exceptions, the following 
subscripts are also omitted from the list of notations: F, E, and W; referring for financially 
integrated firms, entrepreneurial firms and workers, respectively. For clarity: in some cases 
the above subscripts are marked as superscripts. 
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𝑛   Labor 
𝐴   Technology parameter 
𝑧   Exogenous growth rate of technology parameter, 𝐴 
𝑤   Wage 
𝑠   Savings 
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ℒ   Lagrangian 
𝜆   The Lagrange multiplier 
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−1
) appearing in the 
expression of the optimal savings for workers 
𝑚   Managerial compensation for young entrepreneurs 
𝑅   Interest factor on foreign bonds 
𝑅𝑙   The lending rate to the domestic firms 
𝜉  Iceberg cost, into which banks are exposed when lending to 
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𝜌𝐸  The rate of return to capital for E firms 
𝜒 Largest extra efficiency unit per worker (χ > 𝜒) for the 
transition not to occur 
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𝑙𝐸   Bank loans for E firms 
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) appearing in 
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𝜅  The capital per effective unit of labor 
𝐾  Aggregate capital  
?̂?  Largest extra efficiency unit per worker (χ > ?̂?) for the 
employment share for E firms not to grow over time 
𝛾𝐾𝐸 Refers to the term appearing in the expression for the 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the fundamental sources of China’s economic transition since 
1992 is the main focus of this paper. Since the late 1970s, there have been 
only few phenomena as globally significant as China’s remarkable economic 
transition, which I will in this study henceforth simply refer as to the 
transition. During 1978, at the beginning of China’s transition, the state-
owned enterprises accounted for more than three quarters of China’s 
industrial output, and by 2014, the state-owned enterprises yielded only one 
quarter (Zhu 2012). In only a few decades, China has transitioned itself from 
a poor economy dominated by state-owned enterprises into a dynamic and 
increasingly market-driven economy. 
The main features of China’s transition alongside with astonishing economic 
growth have been a growing momentum of the private sector and markets, 
the reallocation of resources within the enterprise sector, sustained returns on 
capital despite of high capital accumulation, a large productivity growth, 
raising inequality and moderate wage growth, high savings and investment 
rates, and the accumulation of an enormous trade surplus. Sectoral swifts 
within the manufacturing sector have been the main drivers of productivity 
growth that is to say mainly the reallocation of labor and capital from low-
productive state-owned enterprises to high-productive private enterprises 
(see Hsieh and Klenow 2009 and Brandt, Van Biesebrock, and Zhang 2012). 
Besides China’s astonishing economic growth, it is also remarkable how the 
main features of China’s transition are in contradiction to several core 
predictions of conventional neoclassical theories. Based on a closed 
economy growth model, the rate of return to capital would decline due to a 
high investment rate. Despite of the high investment rate in China, the rate of 
return to capital has remained high. In an open economy growth model, high 
domestic return to capital would assume a high capital inflow, and hence a 
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large foreign deficit rather than surplus. Standard models also predict that 
capital would flow into the most productive counterparties. In China’s 
growth experience, financial intermediaries have been investing in low-
productive state-owned enterprises rather than high-productive private 
enterprises. 
This thesis has been made as an assignment for Tekes – Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation. In order to comprehensively grasp 
the patterns of China’s transition, I construct a dynamic growth model 
consistent with China’s transitional characteristics. The benchmark model 
was introduced in an article Growing like China in the American Economic 
Review in February 2011 by Zheng Song, Kjetil Storesletten and Fabrizio 
Zilibotti. The model accounts for China’s high growth rate, high return to 
capital and accumulation of foreign surplus. The cornerstones of the theory 
are heterogeneity in productivity between the state-owned and private 
enterprises, reallocation of resources within the enterprise sector and 
asymmetric financial imperfections. The reallocation of labor and capital 
from the state-owned enterprises to private enterprises creates the two 
specific features of China’s transition: sustained returns to capital and a large 
foreign surplus. 
Private enterprises are financially constrained due to financial imperfections, 
but possess higher productivity than state-owned enterprises, which are 
externally financed. Hence private enterprises must rely on entrepreneurial 
savings to finance their investments. On the other hand, despite that state-
owned enterprises have lower productivity, they can survive in the 
equilibrium due to the favoring of the financial intermediaries that allows a 
better access to external financing. Because of the inequality of the financial 
sector, the growth of the private enterprises is being limited to 
entrepreneurial savings. If the entrepreneurial savings are large enough, the 
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private enterprises will step by step outgrow the state-owned enterprises 
from the market. 
The model explains the features which are in contradiction with the 
neoclassical growth theories. During the transition phase nor private or state-
owned enterprises are subject to diminishing return to capital. Sustained 
returns to capital originates from the labor mobility within the enterprise 
sector, low growth rate and from the financial preference of low-productive 
enterprises. Moreover, the aggregate rate of return to capital increases rather 
due to a composition effect. Sustained returns to capital is a feature that is in 
effect only during the transition. Once the transition phase is over capital 
accumulation is subject to diminishing return to capital.  
The accumulation of the foreign surplus originates from financial 
imperfections. The wage earners deposit their savings to the banks, which in 
turn, can either invest to domestic firms or in foreign bonds. As the transition 
progresses the volume of high-productive financially constrained firms 
increase while the volume of low-productive externally financed firms 
decrease. Hence, a higher amount of domestic savings are invested in foreign 
assets by the financial intermediaries, which in turn, causes the foreign 
surplus to increase. 
This thesis is motivated by several questions. A popular explanation for 
China’s foreign surplus is China’s exchange rate manipulation (see 
Goldstein and Lardy 2009). This thesis gives an alternative explanation to 
China’s foreign surplus. Difficulties working with the Chinese data are 
widely recognized (see Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang 2014). The 
method of understanding China’s transition through a theoretical framework 
allows to concentrate to the idiosyncrasies of China’s transition and gives a 
comprehensive general view over the whole phenomenon. Besides of how 
well does the model represent China’s transition, this thesis addresses the 
following questions: Why does a country accumulate a foreign surplus 
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despite of high domestic rate of return? Why does a country’s rate of return 
to capital remain high in spite of high investment rates? 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows: In chapter two, I review 
the theoretical and empirical works related to China’s transition and to the 
model presented. In chapter three, I present a narrative interpretation with 
empirical evidence of China’s transition. In chapters four to seven, I 
construct a growth model that captures China’s transition presented in 
chapter three. In chapter four, I present the basic structure of the model: 
preferences, enterprise sector, how the wages, savings and investments are 
formed in the model, the profit maximizations of both state-owned and 
private firms and the entrepreneurs’ investment problem. In chapter five, I 
characterize the equilibrium dynamics during the transition. In chapter six, I 
present the country’s growing foreign surplus along with the country’s 
increasing gross saving rate and gross investment rate during the transition. 
In chapter seven, I present the post-transition equilibrium. Chapter eight 
concludes. I discuss the main results and assumptions of the model and the 
relationship of the model and China’s transition. 
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2. Research overview 
In this chapter, I briefly overview earlier and recent most significant 
theoretical and empirical works that have influenced to the model presented 
in this thesis. 
China’s huge saving rates and macroeconomic imbalances has been widely 
recognized, but a huge part of the academic research focuses often only to 
the saving rates (e.g. Ma and Wang 2010 and Kraay 2000) or to the 
connection of trade surplus and exchange rates (e.g. Goldstein, M. and 
Lardy, N. 2009). This thesis is a part of the literature that offer understanding 
for both saving rates and external imbalances in China (e.g. Yang 2012). In 
order to find the reason why China is accumulating a large foreign surplus, I 
underline, as do most papers, China’s high savings rate. Yang (2012) argues 
that the main reasons for China’s high savings rate and current account 
surplus are the combination of policies, institutions and structural distortions. 
Following the same explanation, Kraay (2000) emphases the role of 
imperfect financial sector as one of the factors for China’s high saving 
account. Interestingly, Kraay highlights the banking sectors’ poor-
performing loans to state-owned enterprises when addressing the concerns 
created by the growth in deposits in the banking system creates.  
Yang (2012) also underlined the national income identity, which clarifies the 
link between domestic and international linkages; the national savings not 
invested or consumed domestically are invested abroad. Given the high rate 
of return to capital in China the following puzzle arises: Why are the 
domestic savings not invested domestically? Yang argues that the inefficient 
financial system has failed to channel domestic savings to high return 
investments or consumption loans, the excess savings have been invested by 
Chinese banks mainly in low-yielding U.S. government bonds. 
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The model in this thesis has been influenced by the recent literature claiming 
that resource misallocation creates the low aggregate total factor productivity 
(TFP) particularly in developing economies (see Restuccia and Rogerson 
2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009 and Brandt, Van Biesebrock and Zhang 
2012). Especially Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Brandt et al. (2012), who 
have both focused on China, presented how productivity growth has been 
affected by resource reallocation in the manufacturing sector. 
Although in the model presented in this thesis the main focus is in the 
reallocation within the enterprise sector, it has, in some respects, similar 
mechanism as in the Lewis (1954) model. Lewis model is based on the idea 
of dual economy; the focus of the Lewis’ model is overpopulated countries 
(i.e. developing economies), where the development process is explained by 
the movement of low-productive underemployed workers from traditional 
sectors to modern sectors. Compared with the modern sector, the attributes 
of the traditional sector are that it has lower living standards (i.e. subsistence 
sector) and the marginal product of workers is negligible (or even negative). 
Vice versa the modern sector (i.e. capitalist sector) has higher output per 
worker. At the beginning of the development process, due to the unlimited 
supply of labor, the modern sector can expand without raising wages, which 
creates higher returns to capital. In conclusion, the expansion of modern 
sector creates growth. (Gollin 2014.) 
Moving in similar areas as in the model presented in this thesis, giving 
explanation to the East Asian Miracle, Ventura (1997) provided a model, 
where he explains how economies characterized by high saving rates are not 
under the influence of diminishing returns. Unlike in the model of this thesis, 
where TFP grows in each industry and countries suffer from initial 
inefficiency, the intuition in Ventura’s model goes as follows: capital 
accumulation is not subject to decreasing returns, because as the capital 
stock increases, resources are reallocated from labor-intensive to capital-
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intensive sector, and hence the demand for capital raises. Preventing the fall 
of prices, external trade moves the excess production of capital-intensive 
goods into exports. 
From the point of view of trade imbalances, the model presented in this 
thesis is related to the model by Antrás and Caballero (2009). Although the 
mechanism is different, in the model presented in this thesis, less-efficient 
firms can survive due to a better access to the credit markets. Antrás and 
Caballero showed that when trade frictions are large, capital will run from 
the less financially developed economy to the financially developed 
economy. They also show that the capital movement will increase the 
comparative disadvantage sector in the financially developed economy, 
shrinking the comparative advantage sector in the less financially developed 
economy, hence reducing the trade flows across economies. A financially 
underdeveloped economy is able to allocate resources in sectors in which 
financial frictions are less problematic. Vice versa, if trade frictions are 
small, then capital will run from the financially developed economy to the 
comparative advantage sector of the financially underdeveloped economy, 
and boost the trade flows across economies.  
The inconsistency between the standard neoclassical growth model’s 
predictions and the empirical evidence of the capital flows across developing 
countries is well documented by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). Based on 
the standard open economy neoclassical growth model, countries with high 
marginal product of capital and higher productivity growth should invest and 
attract more foreign capital. Gourinchas and Jeanne showed that there is a 
net capital outflow rather than inflow in fast-growing developing countries. 
The growth model presented in this thesis gives a rationalization to the above 
mentioned discrepancy phenomenon, also known as the allocation puzzle. 
Buera and Shin (2016) gives an alternative approach on explaining why 
capital tends to flow out instead of floating in to the economies characterized 
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with fast-growing productivity. Similarly to the model presented in this 
thesis, they highlight the role of domestic financial distortions. In their 
model the heterogeneity of producers and the distortions of domestic 
financial markets are in the key role of explaining the joint dynamics of the 
rise of TFP and the directions of capital flows. The efficient reallocation of 
resources, caused by economic reforms, rises TFP, but due to financial 
market distortions, the saving rates expands unlike investment rates, which 
reacts with a lag creating the capital to flow out of the country. In explaining 
the rise of domestic saving rates, Buera and Shin highlight agents who save 
to cover the costs of becoming an entrepreneur. 
The model has similarities to the model made by Caselli and Gennaioli 
(2013), where they examined the corporate-arrangements between rich and 
poor countries. They presented how the poor countries rely more on dynastic 
family firms, where ownership and control are passed from generation to 
another. They show that dynastic management reduces firm’s TFP if the heir 
of the family has no talent in managerial skills. Although in the model of this 
thesis the managers of private firms have the opposite talents (i.e. superior 
management skills), the similarities are indisputable.  
China’s structural transformation has been examined a in growing amount of 
literature. Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2012) created a two-sector 
neoclassical growth model to examine quantitatively China’s structural 
transformation between 1978 and 2003. Despite their focus on the 
reallocation of resources from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural 
sector, they found that the sectoral productivity growth and gradual 
reduction of the Chinese government had a notable role on the Chinese 
transformation. 
Focusing more on the financial frictions between private and state-owned 
enterprises, Curtis (2016) presented a model with two sectors in production 
to represent China’s financial frictions between private and state sectors. As 
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in the model presented in this thesis, the expansion of private firms and the 
reduction of state-owned firms contributes to the growth in TFP. Also, with 
similar assumptions, private firms are more productive and financially 
constrained while state-owned firms are less-productive and not financially 
constrained. The model created by Curtis gives additional insights of China’s 
TFP dynamics. 
The microfoundations of the model presented in this thesis have been 
influenced by the model created by Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Reenen and 
Zilibotti (2007). They analyzed the relationship of decentralization decision 
of firms and the diffusion of new technologies. As in the model of this thesis, 
firms can choose between centralized or decentralized control. Decentralized 
control delegates the decision making authority to a manager who possesses 
superior information. However, the manager can use this advantage to make 
decisions that are incontradiction with the principals’ preferences. 
Moreover, the model presented in this thesis acts as a benchmark model for 
further extensions and modifications. Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) 
modified the model by removing the laissez-faire environment by adding 
capital controls and regulations of the financial system to study how they 
affect to the key measures such as the growth in wages and productivity and 
trade surplus. In their modification, the economy is a non-monetary small 
semi-open economy. Consumers demand two goods that are produced by 
domestic firms or abroad. F firms have access to external financing. 
Contrary to the original model, domestic savers, firms and banks cannot 
access the international credit market due to the capital controls and only the 
government can hold positive or negative debt positions with rest of the 
world.  
Also, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) modified the model by introducing 
labor market frictions in addition to financial frictions. In this extension, 
labor costs differ between E and F firms due to a labor wedge affecting E 
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firms. Prior to the economic reforms, the wedge is assumed to be immense, 
so that there is no employment in E firms. Once the economic reforms begin, 
the wedge starts to diminish. The transition is ignited by the change in the 
labor wedge in E firms. Moreover, in their extension, banks do not lend to E 
firms. In the original model, E firms can borrow from the banks up to a limit. 
Similarly to the original model, F firms survive due to better access to 
external funding and during the transition E firms out-grow F firms. 
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3. Features of China’s economic 
transition 
In this chapter, I present a narrative interpretation of China’s economic 
transition along with empirical evidence. The main focus of this thesis is 
post-1992, but due to the fundamental understanding of China’s transition, I 
start the examination from 1978. First I shortly go through the main 
macroeconomic trends of China’s transition in a chronological fashion. In 
the second part I examine the resource reallocation within the enterprise 
sector, productivity differences between state-owned and private firms, 
wage structure, and the rising inequality. In the third part I examine the 
financial sector imperfections along with institutions. Finally I examine 
accumulation of foreign imbalances and aggregate savings and investment 
rates. 
3.1 Economic reforms since 1978 
China’s first economic reforms started in December 1978, when the 
government announced a general policy of reform and opening up the 
society. The economic reforms occurred more in an experimental and 
gradual way and at least initially there was no grand design. (Zhu 2011.) 
China has separated its economy into two segments: rural and urban. Labor 
mobility between rural and urban sectors was extremely slight before the 
economic reforms started in the late 1970s. The reason why there was de 
facto no rural to urban mobility was due to the household registration 
practice so-called hukou system. The economic reforms for rural and urban 
sectors began in different periods. (Meng 2012.) 
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The economic reforms started from the agricultural sector, influenced by 
several food crises in the past. The early reforms accelerated the role of 
township and village-level governments, e.g. township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), which created the rural industrial enterprises. As 
mentioned earlier, the first rural reforms occurred gradually; the reforms 
were completed in 1984. In the agricultural sector, the TFP grew 5.62 
percent per year between 1978 and 1984, and as a result, agricultural output 
grew by 47 percent during the same period. Also, during the same period, the 
total employment of agriculture fell from 69 percent into 50 percent. (Zhu 
2011.) 
Alongside with the agricultural reforms, China’s government established 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which had an important role in China’s 
transition. The establishment of SEZs opened up the economy to the foreign 
direct investments and to the distribution of technological knowledge. 
Characteristics of SEZs were lower corporate tax, subtraction of custom 
duty, lower land prices and flexibility in financial contracts and labor. 
Owning to the initial success of SEZs, they progressively expanded; starting 
from four SEZs, in 1984 SEZs expanded to 14 coastal cities, later to three 
delta areas and two provinces, and lastly gradually in 1992, 1998 and 2005, 
SEZs expanded to first to inland capitals and then to medium-sized cities. 
(Storesletten and Zilibotti 2014.) 
As a result of the increased productivity due to the rural economic reforms 
between 1978 and 1984, the rural unemployment also increased. By the mid-
1980s the rural unemployment had become a growing problem. The first 
solution for the rural unemployment issue was to encourage to establish 
TVEs. After the establishment of SEZs, the demand for services and 
unskilled labor rose in SEZs and started a limited rural-urban migration. 
However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the rural to urban migration was 
remarkably restricted. After the mid-1990s demand for unskilled labor rose 
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significantly due to the economic growth in cities and especially after China 
joined to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the demand bursted 
and hence migration restrictions were notably attenuated. In 1990, 1997 and 
2009 there were 25 million, 37 million and 145 million rural migrant 
workers in cities, respectively. (Meng 2012.) 
During the mid-1980s urban labor market reforms began. The reforms were 
mild before the following two events occurred: in the 1980s the urban 
economy experienced notable unemployment as the people who were sent to 
the rural areas to work during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s started to 
return to the cities in the 1980s. In response, the government started to 
encourage self-employment. After these events, the urban hukou labor 
markets began to reform. (Meng 2012.) 
In the mid-1990s more than 40 percent of state-owned enterprises were 
making losses (Meng 2012). However, besides the direct economic impact, 
the SEZs reinforced the economic reforms and hardened the policies of the 
opening up of China’s markets. In the 1980s the majority of the country still 
remained under the influence of the centralized planning system. A new 
stage of reforms began during Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, 
where the paramount leader emphasized deeper economic reforms 
(Storesletten and Zilibotti 2014). This lead to momentum in 1997, when the 
15th Congress of the Communist Party of China officially placed state-owned 
enterprise reforms and endorsed the development of private enterprises. 
Following the new set of policies, private enterprises grew promptly (Zhu 
2012). A new policy called “Hold on the large, let go of the small” was 
introduced. The purpose of the new policy was state-sector restructuring; the 
aim was to retain 1 000 largest state-owned enterprises and to force the 
smaller state-owned enterprises to compete in the marketplace or to declare 
bankruptcy. Examining the industrial output value it can be seen that the 
state and collective sector’s share decreased gradually; in 1990 the share was 
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over 90 percent, in 1997 the share had decreased into 70 percent and in 2008 
the share was only 30 percent (Meng 2012). 
In 1978 only 0.02 percent of urban hukou labor force was self-employed. 
Practically all urban labor force was working in either state or collective 
sectors (Meng 2012). The features throughout the state sector were lifetime 
employment and benefits to urban workers. From 1995 to 2001, during the 
state-sector economic reforms, employment in state-owned enterprises fell 
from 113 million to 67 million and in the urban collective sector from 31.5 
million to 12.9 million. During the same period of the total 43 million 
workers who were registered as laid-offs 34 million were from the state 
sector (Giles, Park and Cai 2006). 
The pre-WTO and post-WTO reforms reduced trade barriers and tariffs, 
liberalized trade and foreign direct investment regimes and improved overall 
business environment (Branstetter and Lardy 2006). Zhu (2012) presented 
that the average annual TFP growth rates for state and non-state sectors were 
5.50 percent and 3.67 percent between 1998 and 2007, respectively. Both 
privatization and trade liberalization improved the productivity of state and 
non-state sectors.  
China’s enterprise and financial sector reforms have occurred in gradual 
pace. The Chinese stock market growth after 1991 is an essential part of the 
financial development. The development of Chinese stock market is highly 
connected with enterprise sector reforms and must be looked at the context 
of partial privatization of SOEs. SOE reforms in the 1980s aimed to 
decentralize the managerial decision rights of central government in SOEs. 
In the 1990s, as part of the partial privatization, SOEs issued minority shares 
for individual investors; in 1990 Shanghai stock market reopened and in 
1991 Shenzhen stock market opened enabling individual investors to trade 
their minority shares on the recently developed stock markets. (Hsu and 
Simon 2016.) 
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As part of the WTO agreement the foreign entry into China’s financial sector 
began in 2006, but the foreign bank activity remains vastly restricted (Hsu 
and Simon 2016). In 2013 the Shanghai Free Trade Zone was established as 
a part of the financial liberalization (Storesletten and Zilibotti 2014). The 
goal of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone is to ease and boost business (Hsu and 
Simon 2016). 
3.2 Resource reallocation, productivity 
differences and income inequality 
There are two fundamental differences between Chinese domestic private 
enterprises (DPEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are the focus 
points of this thesis. The first one is the productivity difference within the 
enterprise sector; DPEs tend to have higher TFP than SOEs (see Hsieh and 
Klenow 2009; Brandt et al. 2012). The second is the discrimination in the 
Chinese financial system; due to financial imperfections DPEs tend to have 
inferior access to external credit than do SOEs (see Allen, Qian, and Qian 
2005; Poncet and Steingrass 2011; Guariglia, Liu, and Song 2011). I will 
examine the financial imperfections in the next section. 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) provided quantitative evidence of how resource 
misallocation has impacted the aggregate TFP and how the reallocation 
within the manufacturing sector has had a wide effect in productivity growth 
in China. They used microdata on manufacturing plants to measure the 
potential volume caused by the misallocation of labor and capital in China in 
comparison of the United States. They found out that reallocation within 
manufacturing sector has increased the productivity efficiency in China by 
two percent per year from 1998 to 2005. Moreover, they estimated that if the 
resources would be reallocated to the level where marginal products would 
equate to the observed levels of the United States, TFP in China would 
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increase from 30 to 50 percentages. If capital would accumulate alongside 
with the aggregate TFP gains, the output would increase approximately 
twice as much. 
Brandt et al. (2012) estimated that between 1998 and 2007 the TFP growth 
in China’s firm-level manufacturing firms was by average 2.58 percent for 
gross output production function and by average 7.96 percent for a value-
added production function. The panel of firms included approximate 90 
percent of gross output in manufacturing. Their results also indicated that 
more than two thirds of the total TFP growth was due to the dynamic force 
of creative destruction, i.e. in China’s case, the enormous entry of new firms 
with the characteristics of higher average productivity and growth rates and 
the exit of inefficient firms. Moreover, the results confirmed the findings in 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), stating that in the Chinese manufacturing sector 
the aggregate TFP growth is constrained by the small volume of efficiency-
enhancing input reallocation between active firms, i.e. resource 
misallocation. 
Figure 1 shows the labor reallocation from SOEs to DPEs: it points out the 
conversion of the employment ratio between SOEs and DPEs within the 
enterprise sector. Based on the annual firm-level NBS surveys, the solid line 
expresses the proportion of DPEs as a percent of DPEs and SOEs. In 1998 
the proportion was only 4 percent, in 2007 the proportion had reached to 56 
percent, and by 2011 the proportion had exceeded 60 percent. For coherence, 
the dotted line shows also conversion of the employment ratio with a broader 
measure of private and state-owned enterprises: it takes into account also the 
foreign enterprises (FEs) and collectively owned enterprises (COEs) so that 
the measurement is as follows: the employment proportion of DPEs and FEs 
as a percent of DPEs, FEs, SOEs and COEs. Both lines show the same 
pattern: the huge decrease of SOEs and increase of DPEs. This is consistent 
with the events described in the previous section. 
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Figure 1: China’s DPE employment shares in the manufacturing sector 
between 1998 and 2011 
Source: Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014), p. 339.2 
It has been widely recognized that DPEs tend to be on average more 
productive than SOEs. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) showed in their estimation 
that the revenue-productivity gap between DPEs and SOEs is 41.5 percent. 
Song et al. (2011) present a productivity difference of 9 percent on average 
between DPEs and SOEs between 1998 and 2007 in their measurement of 
profitability. They measured the ratio between total profits and the book 
value of fixed assets.3 Also based on different TFP calculations Islam, Dai, 
and Sakamoto (2006) and Dollar and Wei (2007) found that SOEs had lower 
productivity than DPEs. 
                                                 
2 Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) used the data from various issues of the China Statistical 
Yearbook. 
3 Song et al. (2011) used the data from various issues of CSY.  
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Based on the calculations by Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) the aggregate 
return to capital in China was approximately 20 percent in 1979 and 25 
percent in 1992. Between 1993 and 1998, the aggregate rate of return to 
capital fell from approximately 25 percent to 20 percent. Between 1998 and 
2005, the aggregate rate of return was roughly around 20 percent, despite the 
huge increase in the investment rate at the same time (8 percent point 
increase). However, they show that since the early 1990s the rate of return to 
capital in primary (agricultural) and tertiary (services) sectors has been 
decreasing while the secondary (construction, mining and manufacturing) 
sector has increased and reached more than 30 percent in 2003.4 Liu and Siu 
(2011) estimated that SOEs have significantly lower return on capital 
investments than non-SOEs. Their findings stated that internal rate of return 
of DPEs is 10 percent higher than SOEs.5 
Moderate wage growth has been one of the features of China’s transition. 
The real annual earnings for urban hukou workers grew from 3 880 yuan in 
1988 to 19 674 yuan in 2009 (Meng 2012). Despite of the continuous wage 
growth, the actual wage growth has been de facto moderate during this time. 
Ge and Yang (2014) estimated by using a sample of national Urban 
Household Surveys that between 1992 and 2007 the annual growth of wages 
in the manufacturing sector was 7.6 percent, while the annual GDP growth 
rate per capita during the same period was 9.7 percent. Ge and Yang 
identifies in their decomposition analysis that the main sources of wage 
growth in China have been higher wage for basic labor, increased returns on 
human labor and the rise in state-sector wage premiums. Moreover, Ge and 
Yang showed that while the average real wage in urban areas grew by 202 
percent, the wage growth is not only explained by the growth in wage for 
unskilled labor; at the same period, the growth for middle-school educated 
                                                 
4 Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) used market prices, not constant prices, in calculating the 
capital stock. 
5 The data Liu and Siu (2011) used is based on Industrial Survey data collected by NBS. 
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workers grew 135 percent, while the growth for collage-educated workers 
was 240 percent. Also the employment change between 1992 and 2007 was -
16.7 percent for middle-school educated workers and 16.9 percent for 
collage-educated workers. This implies that the share of educated labor has 
clearly risen. 
Meng (2012) presented that the Gini coefficient for annual wages grew from 
0.26 in 1988 to 0.38 in 2009. Amongst the urban population the income 
inequality has escalated substantially. The wage structure has equally had 
notable changes. During the 1990s, the difference between the state sector’s 
and private sector’s wages were substantial; the state sector paid notably less 
than the private sector, but the ratio reversed in the 2000s as a part of the 
governments struggle against corruption. Meng (2012) presented that since 
2002, the state sector has been paying along with other benefits 20 percent 
higher wages than private sector. In China, the moderate wage growth along 
with the increasing level of entrepreneurs has affected to income inequality 
(Storesletten and Zilibotti 2014). 
3.3 Asymmetric financial imperfections 
and institutions 
China’s financial sector is highly dominated by a small number of state-
owned banks, therefore the industry is moderately oligopolistic. Private 
banks possess only a small role in China’s financial system. China’s four 
largest banks, all state-owned, compromise 93 percent of the banking 
sector’s market capital and 40-50 percent of the bank loan market share. The 
foreign subsidiaries control only approximately 1 percent of the market 
share. Hence the four largest banks have more market power over the 
financial industry than do thousands of other financial institutions. (Hsu and 
Simon 2016.) 
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The four largest banks are not as efficient or profitable as other types of 
banks. After 2007, the financing constraints have created a shadow banking 
sector. This sector gives alternative methods of financing to institutions that 
are discriminated by the formal banking sector. Through the shadow banking 
sector non-state firms can acquire loans, but risks in the shadow banking 
sector are higher than in the formal banking sector. (Hsu and Simon 2016.) 
The Chinese stock market is dominated by state-owned firms. The equity 
value is the second largest in the world, but the market prices are inefficient 
as the price bubble of 2015 indicated. The capital controls deteriorate the 
interaction between the Chinese financial sector and the international 
financial sector.6 (Hsu and Simon 2016) In a nut shell, the Chinese financial 
sector continues to be underdeveloped. 
Alongside the financial system, the legal system and institutions both remain 
underdeveloped. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) clarified that China’s investor 
protection systems, corporate governance, accounting standards, rule of law, 
corruption and quality of government are all underdeveloped. They also find 
that a notable imperfection in the banking sector is the amount of non-
performing loans from the four largest banks; a significant fraction of these 
loans were made for SOEs from political or non-economic reasons. 
Allen et al. (2005) presented that domestic bank loans, firms’ self-
fundraising, state budget and foreign direct investment important financing 
sources from which bank loans and self-fundraising are the most important 
sources. Between 1994 and 2002 self-fundraising accounted for 
approximately 60 percent of the total funds raised by the private sector. Self-
                                                 
6 For simplicity in the model presented in this thesis the government is assumed not to have 
an active role in altering the exchange or interest rates. The focus of this thesis is not to 
examine the exchange rate policy, but to give an alternative explanation for China’s 
macroeconomic imbalances. See Yang (2012) for more detailed analysis why China’s 
exchange rate policy is not amongst the most important factors causing China’s current 
account surplus. 
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fundraising consist of internal finance, capital raised from friends and family 
of the managers and founders, and capital raised in form of loans and private 
equity. In credit markets private enterprises face severe discrimination. 
Ending up with similar conclusions Poncet and Steingrass (2011) examined 
the magnitude of credit constraints by ownership type using a micro-level 
data set between 1998 and 2005. They also find that DPEs are severely credit 
constrained, while SOEs and FEs are not. Similarly, Guariglia, Liu and Song 
(2011) find evidence of credit discrimination against private firms by using 
firm-level data between 2000 and 2007. 
3.4 Accumulation of net foreign surplus 
and aggregate savings and investment 
rates 
Based on World Bank data, the foreign reserves of China were 25 billion 
USD in 1992, 147 billion USD in 1997, 1 546 billion USD in 2007 and 3 
405 billion USD in 2015. Also the current account surplus of China was 6 
billion USD in 1992, 37 billion USD in 1997, 421 billion USD in 2008 (at 
the peak) and 331 billion USD in 2015 (The World Bank 2016). China’s 
enormous current account and net foreign surplus has been widely 
recognised and researched by economists (e.g. Yu 2007; Yang 2012). Even 
though there is a vast amount of research around China’s external 
imbalances, the attempts to discover the causes of the trade surplus have not 
reach a consensus. 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) showed that on average there is a net capital 
outflow rather than inflow (i.e. accumulating a foreign surplus) in countries 
characterized by fast TFP growth. In order to explain why capital tends to 
flow out instead of an inflow in to economies characterized by fast TFP 
growth, Buera and Shin (2016) highlight the role of domestic financial 
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distortions. They presented that TFP rises due to the efficient reallocation of 
resources. Financial market distortions cause the saving rates to expand. 
Investment rates react with a lag thus creating the capital to flow out of the 
country and accumulating a foreign surplus. 
Figure 2: Foreign reserves and domestic bank deposits minus domestic 
loans and between 1992 and 2011 in China  
Source: Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014), p. 345.7 
Song et al. (2011) offer a structural explanation for the accumulation of 
foreign reserves and China’s financial frictions. As presented in figure 2, the 
timing of accumulation of foreign reserves follows closely with the 
difference between deposits and loans. Moreover, as presented in figure 1, 
                                                 
7 Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) used the data from various issues of the China Statistical 
Yearbook.  
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the growth of DPEs (and the decrease of SOEs) follows the same pattern. 
The intuition comes from national identity: decrease of financially 
constrained SOEs causes the foreign surplus to increase due to a higher 
amount of domestic savings being invested in foreign assets.  
Figure 3: Aggregate savings and investment rates between 1992 and 
2008 
Source: Yang (2012), p. 131.8 
As presented in figure 3, the large aggregate investment rates have been 
outweighed by even higher aggregate savings rate. After 1997 the aggregate 
savings rate has explicitly remained in a higher level. Yang (2012) and 
afterwards Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) showed that the decomposition 
of aggregated savings and investment rates revealed that the largest net 
supplier of savings was the households sector. Moreover, since 1992, the net 
demand of external funds from firms (corporate investments minus savings) 
has had a declining trend. This indicates that a larger proportion of corporate 
investments has been financed through retained earnings rather than from the 
financial sector, i.e. from household savings which are mediated through 
financial sector (Storeletten and Zilibotti 2014). 
                                                 
8 Yang (2012) used the data from Statistical Yearbook of China (NBS 2009). 
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Song et al. (2011) brings up a clarifying statistical relationship between the 
reallocation process in manufacturing and accumulation of foreign surplus 
and productivity growth. The progression of the accumulation of foreign 
reserves and the transition from SOE to DPE follows a similar pattern; 
around the year 2000 both of them accelerated (also seen from figures 1 and 
2).  Song et al. also pointed out that the net surplus, i.e. savings minus 
investments, across provinces offers the same pattern in the cross section. 
Provinces, which were characterized with large growth in the DPE 
employment share, had uniformly a larger net surplus. Moreover, they point 
out that provinces, where the employment share has grown in DPEs, the 
labor productivity has also grown faster. 
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4. Basic structure of the growth model 
In the following four chapters, I construct a dynamic exogenous growth 
model developed by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011). The growth 
theory is consistent with the features of China’s transition presented in 
previous chapter. The microfoundations which allow the heterogeneous 
productivity to exist in equilibrium follows Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, 
Reenen and Zilibotti (2007). The main features of the growth theory are the 
firm-level heterogeneity in productivity, reallocation of resources, and 
financial sector’s inequality. Also one of the key prediction of the model is 
the growing foreign surplus during the transition.  
Following the common custom, uppercase characters are aggregate variables 
and lowercase characters are firm-level or per capita variables. All notations 
used in the model are listed and explained at the beginning of this thesis. 
Also, for simplicity, the time subscripts are omitted from the model when it 
creates no confusion. I present the model in four parts at the following order: 
first I present the environment of the model, second the equilibrium during 
the transition, third the accumulation of foreign surplus, national savings and 
investments, and financial development and fourth the post-transition 
equilibrium.  
In this chapter I present the model’s environment by first presenting the 
preferences of the agents. Then I present the enterprise sector and production 
technologies along with the microfoundations of the theory which explains 
the heterogeneous productivity between state-owned and private firms. In the 
third part of this chapter, I examine how the wages, savings, and investments 
are formed in the model and finally I examine the profit maximizations of 
both state-owned and private firms and the contract between entrepreneurs 
and banks, i.e. the entrepreneurs’ investment problem. 
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4.1 Preferences 
In the model, the economy is modeled by overlapping generations (OLG) of 
agents who live two-periods:  in the first period, the agents work and are 
referred to be young, and in the second period, the agents consume savings 
and are referred to be old. In order to model the preferences of agents, the 
preferences are presented as a time-separable utility function as follows: 
(1) 
𝑈𝑡 =
𝑐1𝑡
1−1𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝛽
𝑐2𝑡
1−1𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
, 
 
 
where 𝑐1𝑡 is the consumption in the first period, 𝑐2𝑡 is the consumption in the 
second period, 𝛽 is referred to be the discount factor and 𝜃 is counted as the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 𝑐𝑡. In the model, the 
concentration is on the case where 𝜃 ≥ 1 so that the rate of return is non-
decreasing for the agents’ savings. 
Population growth rate, which is assumed to be exogenous, is represented by 
𝑣. This encases the demographic changes in China, especially urbanization 
and the rural to urban migration movement. The population growth in group 
𝑁𝑡 is expressed as follows: 
𝑁𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑣)𝑁𝑡. 
The heterogeneous skills that agents possess are inherited from parents to 
children. Each set consists of two different groups of agents: in group 𝑁𝑡 
agents are counted as workers with no entrepreneurial skills and in group 
𝜇𝑁𝑡 agents are counted as entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial skills. This 
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division of agents into two separate groups is essential for the creation of the 
enterprise sector where the division follows the same logic. 
4.2 Enterprise sector and production 
In the model, the enterprise sector is divided into two categories. The first 
category is entrepreneurial firms, which is referred as E firms. This category 
is owned by old entrepreneurs (defined in the previous section), who are 
residual claimants of the profits; they hire only their own children as 
managers (i.e. young entrepreneurs). As mentioned in the previous section, 
the managerial skills, which are superior in E firms, are transferred from 
parents to children (i.e. from old entrepreneurs to young entrepreneurs). This 
allows E firms to use more productive technologies, and hence, be referred 
as high-productivity firms. 
The second category is state-owned and financially integrated firms, which 
are referred as F firms. They are owned by intermediaries (i.e. centralized 
organization, to be defined subsequently in this section), which acts as a 
negative advantage for F firms and causes a productivity drop. Therefore, F 
firms are referred as low-productivity firms. However, financial and 
contractual imperfections cause a preferential position for F firms, which 
have full access to mainly state-owned banks. In the model, international 
financial markets and banks are assumed to be perfectly integrated. F firms 
are assumed to be competitive profit-maximizing firms and act as standard 
neoclassical firms. 
Two of the key assumptions of the theory are (1) the financial sector’s 
inequality and (2) heterogeneous productivity across firms. As a result, E 
firms have a higher productivity but they are financially constrained, and this 
allows F firms, which are financially integrated but have a lower productive, 
to survive in equilibrium. Hence, low-productivity firms survive in 
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equilibrium in consequence of having access to external funds. Moreover, 
the labor market is frictionless and competitive. 
The following microfoundations, which allow firms with heterogeneous 
productivity to exist in equilibrium, follows Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, 
Reenen and Zilibotti (2007). Firms can choose between two modes of 
production which behaves differently for E and F firms (to be defined later). 
In the first production mode, firms can hire a manager to delegate the 
decision making authority. In the second production mode firms can retain 
the direct control and keep the strategic decision making authority in house. 
If firms choose to delegate and hire managers, the benefits are higher 
productivity, and hence, delegation will lead to greater TFP. This can be 
interpreted by the superior information that the manager possesses. This 
advantage can be expressed by 𝜒 extra efficiency units per worker. Note that 
in order delegating authority to gain higher productivity compared to firms 
with centralized control we presume that 𝜒 > 1. 
The production mode differences between E and F firms creates an agency 
problem that arises from delegation. The managers have incentive to steal a 
positive share 𝜓 of the firm’s output. This self-interest driven behavior can 
be prevented by paying managers a compensation 𝑚𝑡 that would be at least 
as large as the amount that the managers could steal. F firms are not as 
efficient in monitoring the managers as E firms. This leads to the assumption 
that managers can steal a share of 𝜓 < 1 of E firms’ output. In the case of F 
firms, due to weak corporate governance of F firms, the managers end up 
stealing all output if F firms choose to delegate. Therefore it is optimal for E 
firms to choose delegation whereas F firms choose always centralized 
control. Hence, F firms would not exist in equilibrium without their better 
access to the financial markets. 
The production function for F firms is as follows: 
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(2) 𝑦𝐹𝑡 = 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼, 
where the output for F firm’s is given as 𝑦𝐹𝑡, the capital for F firm’s is given 
as 𝑘𝐹𝑡, the labor for F firm’s is given as 𝑛𝐹𝑡, the technology parameter is 
given as 𝐴𝑡 (i.e. 𝐴𝑡 is a TFP parameter), and the output elasticities of capital 
and labor are given as 𝛼 and 1 − 𝛼, respectively. Following the same logic 
with the inclusion of extra efficiency units per worker, the production 
function for E firms is as follows: 
(3) 𝑦𝐸𝑡 = 𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼, 
where the output is given as 𝑦𝐸𝑡, capital is given as 𝑘𝐸𝑡, labor is given as 
𝑛𝐸𝑡, and the extra efficiency unit per worker is given as 𝜒. The technology 
and output elasticity parameters are the same for both firm types. After one 
period, the capital depreciates fully. Notice that for E firms the manager’s 
contribution leads to an extra efficiency units per worker 𝜒, but for F firms 
the manager’s contribution is included in 𝑛𝐹 and the manager is therefore 
equivalent to workers. The technology 𝐴 grows at an exogenous rate 𝑧. 
Hence, the technological progress evolves according to an exogenous law of 
motion 
𝐴𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑧)𝐴𝑡. 
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4.3 Wages, savings of the workers and 
banks 
I now examine the interpretation between young workers’ and entrepreneurs’ 
savings and banks. For young workers and banks the relationship goes as 
follows: young workers earn a wage 𝑤𝑡 which can be used either on 
consumption or savings. The savings young workers deposit to competitive 
intermediaries, i.e. banks, which in turn, yields the interest factor 𝑅𝑑 for the 
workers. 
As in a standard two-period OLG model, where agents work in period 1 and 
live off savings in period 2, the budget constraint for period 1 is as follows: 
𝑐1𝑡𝑊 + 𝑠𝑡𝑊 = 𝑤𝑡, 
where 𝑐1𝑡𝑊 is the workers’ consumption in period 1 and 𝑠𝑡𝑊 are the workers’ 
savings in period 1. The budget constraint for period 2 is as follows: 
(4) 𝑐2𝑡𝑊 = 𝑅𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑊, 
where, equivalently, 𝑐2𝑡𝑊 is the workers’ consumption in period 2. Hence, 
combining the budget constraints in both periods, one gets the intertemporal 
budget constraint 
(5) 
𝑐1𝑡𝑊 +
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
= 𝑤𝑡, 
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where 𝑅𝑑 is the interest factor paid by the competitive intermediaries for 
agents’ savings. The conduct of equation (5) is presented in Appendix 1. 
The optimal savings for workers is the solution to the following 
maximization equation, where young workers maximize their utility, 𝑈𝑡, (1): 
max
𝑐1𝑡
𝑊, 𝑐2𝑡
𝑊
𝑐1𝑡
(𝑊)1−
1
𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝛽
𝑐2𝑡
(𝑊)1−
1
𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
 
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint (5). The Lagrange function 
corresponding to young workers’ maximization problem is 
ℒ =
𝑐1𝑡
(𝑊)1−
1
𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝛽
𝑐2𝑡
(𝑊)1−
1
𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝜆 (𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐1𝑡𝑊 +
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
), 
where 𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. The maximization problem yields that 
the optimal savings for young workers are 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 = 𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡, 
where  
(6) 𝜁𝑊 = (1 + 𝛽−𝜃𝑅(𝑑)1−𝜃)
−1
. 
The construct of equation (6) is presented in Appendix 2. 
The investment relation differs for young entrepreneurs: the managerial 
compensation 𝑚𝑡, which the young entrepreneurs earn, can be invested 
either in their family business, i.e. E firms or alternatively in bank deposits. I 
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examine the relationship and intuition between banks and entrepreneurs 
more closely subsequently. 
In the model banks can either invest the collected savings from workers to 
1) foreign bonds which yield a gross return of 𝑅 or 
2) loans to domestic firms. 
In Walrasian equilibrium, i.e. competitive equilibrium, the following 
assumption must hold: 
𝑅𝑑 = 𝑅 =  𝑅𝑙, 
where 𝑅𝑑 is the gross return on domestic loans, 𝑅 is the gross return on 
foreign bonds and 𝑅𝑙 is the lending rate to domestic firms. Given this 
assumption, in competitive equilibrium, the gross return on domestic loans 
equals to the gross return on foreign bonds, which equals to the lending rate 
to domestic firms. Lending to the firms exposure banks to an iceberg cost 𝜉, 
which consists of bureaucracy costs, operational expenses, etc., and can be 
seen as intermediation efficiency’s inverse measurement. Note that lending 
rate for domestic firms is as follows: 
(7) 
𝑅𝑙 =
𝑅
(1 − 𝜉)
, 
and therefore subject to an iceberg cost 𝜉. However, an iceberg cost has no 
role in this part of the analysis, and hence it is assumed to be 𝜉 = 0. In order 
to examine the financial development more closely, 𝜀 would become 
important, but for simplicity and without loss of generality, it is being 
assumed to be zero (to be discussed more in section 6.4). 
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Various contractual imperfections between the banks and entrepreneurs 
cause hindrances to their relationship. In the model, due to the not verifiable 
output of E firms, the entrepreneurs can only promise to the banks to repay a 
share 𝜂 from the net profits of second period. If we would assume that 
entrepreneurs could commit to repay, it would change the dynamics of the 
whole model; then F firms would hire old entrepreneurs and all firms would 
be managed by entrepreneurs. 
4.4 Profit maximizations and the contract 
between entrepreneurs and banks 
I now examine the profit maximizations for both F and E firms. In the F 
firms’ case, the profit maximization states the following: lending rate for 
domestic firms, 𝑅𝑙, equals to the marginal product of capital. Equivalently 
wages equal to the marginal product of labor. Taking the partial derivative 
with respect to capital from F firms’ production function (2) gives the 
marginal product of capital 
𝜕𝑦𝐹𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝐹𝑡
= 𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼−1(𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼 = 0. 
Hence, as being stated earlier, 𝑅𝑙 equals to the marginal product of capital 
(8) 𝑅𝑙 = 𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼−1(𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼, 
which yields 
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(9) 
𝑛𝐹𝑡 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴1−𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼
. 
The construct of equation (9) is presented in Appendix 3. Equivalently, 
taking partial derivatives with respect to labor from F firms’ production 
function gives the marginal product of labor 
𝜕𝑦𝐹𝑡
𝜕𝑛𝐹𝑡
= 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡(𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)−𝛼 = 0. 
Equivalently, as stated earlier, wages equal to the marginal product of labor 
(10) 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡(𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)−𝛼. 
Plugging (9) into (10) yields the equilibrium wage 
(11) 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡. 
 
 
The construct of equilibrium wage is presented in Appendix 4. 
In E firms’ case, we need to take in account the fundamental differences 
between firm attributes. E firms are owned by old entrepreneurs with 𝜒 extra 
efficiency units per worker and with capital 𝑘𝐸𝑡. The value function is 
created by diminishing the costs of E firms, which are managerial 
compensation and wages for workers, from equation (3). Hence the value of 
an E firm is the solution to the following maximization equation: 
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(12) Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = max𝑚𝑡, 𝑛𝐸𝑡
{𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼 − 𝑚𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡}.  
 
This is subject to the managerial incentive constraint 
𝑚𝑡 ≥ 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼, 
where, as stated before, 𝑚𝑡 is seen as the managerial compensation, and 𝑤𝑡 
as the wage for workers, implied by the arbitrage in the labor markets, as 
defined earlier in (11). Note that the following assumption must stand: 
𝑚𝑡 > 𝑤𝑡. 
Hence, payment to the manager must outweigh the workers’ wage rate. As 
stated earlier, the managers in F firms make no discretionary decisions. 
Hence they are not subject to any incentive constraint and thus the managers 
earn the same wage as workers. As a result there are no separation for wages 
for F firms’ managers and workers. By redesigning the managerial incentive 
constraint as follows: 
(13)  𝑚𝑡 = 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼,  
 
the managerial incentive constraint is now binding as the optimal contract 
implicates. Plugging equilibrium wage (11) and managerial incentive 
constraint (13) into equation (12) yields the following maximization 
problem: 
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  max
 𝑛𝐸𝑡
{𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼 − (𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼)
− ((1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡)𝑛𝐸𝑡}. 
Taking the first order conditions with respect to 𝑛𝐸  yields 
(14) 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 = ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
. 
 
 
The construct of equation (14) is presented in Appendix 5. Plugging the 
equations (13), (11), and (14) into equation (12) yields 
(15) 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = 𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡 (((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
))
1−𝛼
 
−
(
 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (χ𝐴𝑡 (((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
))
1−𝛼
)
  
−((1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡)(((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
). 
Modifying the equation (15) yields the value of E firm 
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(16) Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = (1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼χ
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙𝑘𝐸𝑡 ≡ 𝜌𝐸𝑘𝐸𝑡, 
 
 
where E firms rate of return to capital is denoted to 𝜌𝐸. The construct of 
equation (16) is presented in Appendix 6. Assumption 1 verifies that the rate 
of return to capital for E firms is higher than the lending rate for domestic 
firms: 
(17) 𝜌𝐸 > 𝑅𝑙. 
Assumption 1  
For the transition to occur, a sufficiently large difference in productivity 
between E and F firms is essential: 
(18) 
𝜒 > 𝜒 ≡ (
1
1 −𝜓)
1
1−𝛼
. 
 
Assumption 1 is necessary for E firms; if the assumption would not exist, the 
model would not work and there would not be any E firms in equilibrium. 
The assumption indicates that E firms favor delegation over centralization. 
Given the assumption, it is also ideal for young entrepreneurs to invest in the 
family business.  
I next derive the contract between banks and entrepreneurs. E firms can 
finance their operations by internal savings or by lending from the banks. 
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Key assumption here is that the rate of return to capital for E firms is higher 
than the lending rate for domestic firms, as stated in equation (17). The 
composition of E firms’ capital stock is as follows: 
(19) 𝑘𝐸𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡−1𝐸 + 𝑙𝑡−1𝐸 , 
where  𝑠𝑡−1𝐸  refers to the savings of the young entrepreneurs and 𝑙𝑡−1𝐸  refers 
to the bank loan. The entrepreneur’s incentive-compatibility constraint can 
be presented as follows: 
(20) 𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐸 ≤ 𝜂𝜌𝐸(𝑠𝐸 + 𝑙𝐸), 
where, as stated before, 𝑅𝑙 is the lending rate for domestic firms, 𝜂 is the 
share that entrepreneurs can promise to repay to the banks and 𝜌𝐸 is the rate 
of return to capital for E firm. Equation (17) holds, i.e. 𝜌𝐸 > 𝑅𝑙. Hence the 
incentive-compatibility constraint is binding if and only if  
𝜂 <
𝑅𝑙
𝜌𝐸
, 
which is assumed to be true. Using equation (20), the share of bank invested 
investments for entrepreneurs can be presented as follows: 
(21) 𝑙𝐸
𝑙𝐸 + 𝑠𝐸
=
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
. 
The construct of equation (21) is presented in Appendix 7. 
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Consider, next, the entrepreneur’s investment problem. The maximization 
problem can be presented by finding optimal choices of 𝑙𝐸 and 𝑠𝐸 that 
maximize the discounted utility function subject to 
(22) 𝑐1𝑡𝐸 = 𝑚− 𝑠𝐸, 
(23)  𝑐2𝑡𝐸 = 𝜌𝐸(𝑙𝐸 + 𝑠𝐸) − 𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐸, 
and the incentive-compatibility constraint (21). Using (21) to substitute 𝑙𝐸 
from equation (23), the consumption in period 2 can be expressed as follows: 
(24) 
 𝑐2𝑡𝐸 =
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸. 
The construct of equation (24) is presented in Appendix 8. After substituting 
𝑙𝐸, and plugging the equations (22) and (24) into equation (1), the 
entrepreneur’s investment maximization problem is as follows: 
 
(25) 
max
𝑠𝐸
(𝑚 − 𝑠𝐸)
1−1𝜃 − 1
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝛽
(
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸)
1−1𝜃
− 1
1 − 1𝜃
. 
The solution to the maximization problem yields that the optimal savings are  
(26) 𝑠𝐸 = 𝜁𝐸𝑚𝑡, 
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where 𝜁𝐸  is defined as follows: 
(27) 
𝜁𝐸 ≡ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
. 
The construct of equation (26) is presented in Appendix 9. 
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5. Equilibrium dynamics during the 
transition 
In this chapter, I characterize the equilibrium dynamics in the course of the 
transition. First I present how E firms have a lower capital-output ratio than 
do F firms. In the second and third part of this chapter I present the 
equilibrium dynamics first to E firms and then to F firms. Note that at the 
time of the transition, positive employment is assumed to occur for both F 
and E firms. In the last part of this chapter, I present how the GDP per 
worker increases along with the average rate of return to capital during the 
transition.  
As Song et al. (2011) points out the financial frictions affect the flow of 
capital by obstructing entrepreneurial firms, which are more productive than 
F firms, from borrowing external funds from banks. This is essential for the 
model to function. Without financial frictions entrepreneurs could borrow 
external funding without barriers. This would cause the transition to occur 
instantly and only E firms would be in equilibrium. With the financial 
frictions in the model the transition phase will occur in a gradual pace.  
5.1 Capital-output ratios 
The financial system imperfections favor F firms and discriminate E firms, 
which are pressed to choose a lower capital-output ratio than F firms. Hence 
in equilibrium, E firms have a lower capital-output ratio than do F firms. To 
present this, as in common case (i.e. in this model for F firms), I first denote 
the capital per effective unit of labor as follows: 
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(28) 
𝜅𝐹 ≡
𝑘𝐹
(𝐴𝐹𝑛𝐹)
, 
where technology is given as 𝐴𝐹, labor is given as 𝑛𝐹 and capital is given as 
𝑘𝐹 for 𝐹 firms. Note that for E firms capital per effective unit of labor must 
be expressed as follows: 
(29) 
𝜅𝐸 ≡
𝑘𝐸
(𝜒𝐴𝐸𝑛𝐸)
, 
where one needs to take into account the extra efficiency unit per worker 𝜒.9 
As presented in equation (8), for F firms, the lending rate for domestic firms 
𝑅𝑙 equals to the marginal product of capital. Therefore by plugging equation 
(28) into (8), the capital per effective unit of labor for F firms is as follows: 
(30) 
𝜅𝐹 = (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
1
1−𝛼
. 
 
 
The construct for equation (30) is presented in Appendix 10. F firms operate 
as standard neoclassical firms. Hence, as in open-economy growth models, 
since 𝜅𝐹 is constant, the equilibrium wage for workers in F firms, which is 
presented in equation (11), grows at the rate of technical progress  
                                                 
9 In the original model by Song et al. (2011), the capital by effective unit of labor was 
presented only as equation (28) describes. Without losing consistency, I added the equation 
(29) to clarify the differences between E and F firms. 
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(31) 𝑤𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑧)𝑤𝑡. 
By following the similar process than in constructing the equation (30), 
plugging equations (29) and (30) into equation (14) yields the capital-output 
ratio for E firms 
(32) 
𝜅𝐸 = 𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼.  
 
The construct of equation (32) is presented in Appendix 11. After defining 
the capital-output ratios for both E and F firms, along with Assumption 1, 
the analysis leads to Lemma 1: 
Lemma 1  
The capital-output ratio for E firms is lower than capital-output ratio for F 
firms: 𝜅𝐸 < 𝜅𝐹, since 
(33) 𝑘𝐸
𝑦𝐸
= 𝜅𝐸1−𝛼 < 𝜅𝐹1−𝛼 =
𝑘𝐹
𝑦𝐹
. 
Moreover, E firms have a lower labor-output ratio than F firms if 
Assumption 1 is in effect (i.e. 𝜒 > 𝜒 ≡ ( 1
1−𝜓
)
1
1−𝛼): 
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(34) 𝑘𝐹
𝑛𝐹
𝑘𝐸
𝑛𝐸
=
𝜅𝐹𝐴
𝜅𝐸𝜒𝐴
= (
𝜒
𝜒
)
1−𝛼
𝛼 10 
The construct of equations (33) and (34) are presented in Appendixes 12 and 
13, respectively. 
5.2 Equilibrium dynamics for E firms 
Owing to constant return to scale, lower-case individual-firm variables can 
be replaced by upper-case aggregate variables. Hence, aggregation gives the 
following equations 
(35) 
𝜅𝐸𝑡 ≡
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡)
, 
and 
(36) 𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
Since 𝜅𝐸𝑡 is constant, by using simple algebra, equation (35) can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝑁𝐸𝑡 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝜅𝐸𝑡)
. 
                                                 
10 I present the correct representation of equation (34). A typo found from the Appendix of 
Song et al. (2011) is fixed. 
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Plugging this into equation (36) yields 
(37) 
𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 −
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝜅𝐸𝑡)
, 
where 𝜅𝐸𝑡 is given by (32). Before starting to examine the equilibrium 
dynamics more closely, it is clarifying to look at the three main properties of 
the model: 
i. 𝐾𝐸𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡 are considered as state variables. The fact that 𝐾𝐹𝑡 is not a 
state variable stems from equation (30).  
ii. For both E and F firms, the capital per effective unit of labor, i.e. 𝜅𝐸 
and 𝜅𝐹, is constant. 
iii. Entrepreneurial savings are considered to be linear in 𝐾𝐸𝑡 in period t, 
i.e. 𝐾𝐸𝑡+1. 
The three main properties imply that for E firms the capital, employment and 
output grows at a constant rate in the course of the transition. In order to 
continue to the subsequent Lemma, I modify the equation (19) by moving it 
from period (t – 1) to period t, so that the capital for the next period for E 
firms is as follows: 
(38) 𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝐸 + 𝑙𝑡𝐸. 
Replacing 𝑙𝑡𝐸 by modifying and plugging equation (21) into equation (38) 
and then replacing 𝑠𝑡𝐸 by plugging equation (26) into equation (38) yields 
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(39) 
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝑚𝑡, 
where 𝜁𝐸  is determined in equation (27). The construct of equation (39) is 
presented in Appendix 14. Using equation (13) to replace 𝑚𝑡, and 
aggregating over all entrepreneurs gives  the following: 
(40) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝜓𝜅𝐸𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡, 11 
The construct of equation (40) is presented in Appendix 15. This leads to the 
equation (41) and to the following lemma by dividing both sides of (40) by 
𝐾𝐸𝑡 and using equations (32) and (30) to replace 𝜅𝐸 (i.e. using the 
equilibrium expression of 𝜅𝐸): 
Lemma 2  
In the course of the transition, given 𝐾𝐸𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡, E firms’ equilibrium 
dynamics of total capital is as follows: 
(41) 𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= 1 + 𝛾𝐾𝐸, 
 
 
and accordingly, E firms’ equilibrium dynamics of total employment is given 
as follows: 
                                                 
11 I present the correct representation of equation (40). In Appendix of Song et al. (2011), 𝜒 
was missing from the equation. The missing 𝜒 is essential in order to calculate the standard 
neoclassical law of motion in equation (54) in chapter 7 (i.e. Post-Transition Equilibrium). 
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(42) 𝑁𝐸𝑡+1
𝑁𝐸𝑡
=
(1 + 𝛾𝐾𝐸)
(1 + 𝑧)
≡ 1 + 𝑣𝐸, 
where 
(43) 1 + 𝛾𝐾𝐸 
=
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
𝜌𝐸
𝛼
, 
 
 
where as in equation (16) the rate of return to capital for E firms is 
𝜌𝐸 = (1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
(1−𝛼)
𝛼 𝑅𝑙 
and as in equation (7), the lending rate for domestic firms is 
𝑅𝑙 =
𝑅
(1 − 𝜉)
. 
Note that there exists such ?̂? = ?̂?(𝛽, 𝜒, 𝜓, 𝜂, 𝛼, 𝑣, 𝑧, 𝑅, 𝜉) < ∞ so that, for E 
firms, if and only if 𝜒 > ?̂?, the employment share (i.e.  𝑁𝐸
𝑁
) grows over time 
(i.e. 𝑣𝐸 > 𝑣). Note that E firms’ employment share grows if 𝑧 and 𝑣 are 
sufficiently small or if 𝛽 and 𝜂 are sufficiently large, ceteris paribus. ?̂? is 
increasing in 𝑧 and 𝑣, and decreasing in 𝛽 and 𝜂. 
The proof of Lemma 2 is presented in Appendix 16. Also, the definition for 
?̂? is presented the Appendix 16. The constant growth rate of 𝐾𝐸𝑡 depends on 
two facts: Firstly, the savings and earnings of young entrepreneurs are 
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proportional to the profits of E firms. Secondly, E firms’ rate of return to 
capital is constant. 
In order to demonstrate this, the following assumptions need to be made: 
during the transition, suppose that the technological growth rate 𝑧 is zero, 
and by equation (31), the wage for workers would remain constant. The 
inequality between workers and entrepreneurs rises from the fact that the 
managerial compensation, 𝑚𝑡, depends on the output of E firms and grows 
proportionally along with the output. Since the entrepreneurial savings are 
used to finance the investments in E firms, and wages, which are constant 
(depending on the growth rate of 𝑧), escape a falling return to investment, 
the growing earning inequality is necessary for the transition to take place; 
the entrepreneurial investments would not rise, if young entrepreneurs would 
not earn any rents but instead only 𝑤𝑡. 
Note the following condition: the growth rate is hump-shaped in 𝜓. In order 
to view this, the expression of 𝜌𝐸 from equation (16) needs to be plugged 
into equation (43). One can see that 
i. if the value of 𝜓 is small, i.e. entrepreneurial rents are minor, the 
young entrepreneurs are considered as poor and the investments are 
low; and 
ii. if the value of 𝜓 is large, it impacts to E firms’ profitability and 
growth (𝜌𝐸) negatively.  
The theory has an interesting phenomenon: it can predict a miscarried take-
off. The TFP gap (i.e. 𝜒1−𝛼) is required to be large in the conditions of 𝜒 in 
Assumption 1 and in Lemma 2 (i.e. 𝜒 > 𝜒, and 𝜒 > ?̂?, respectively). In 
general, only one of the conditions will be binding. A miscarried take-off can 
be created in the following situation: In the beginning, both of the conditions 
are satisfied, but for instance due to fall in 𝛽, the entrepreneurial saving rate 
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𝜁𝐸  in equation (27) drops. Then after the shock the conditions would state 
the following: 
?̂?(∙, 𝛽) > 𝜒 > 𝜒. 
In this case, the employment share of E firms would decrease while the 
investments of E firms would increase over time. 
5.3 Equilibrium dynamics for F firms 
I next present the equilibrium dynamics for F firms. During the transition, 
the equilibrium dynamics for F firms can be presented as follows: 
(44) 𝐾𝐹𝑡 = 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡), 
where, residually, the workers not being employed by E firms are employed 
by F firms. Moreover, 𝐾𝐹 adjusts to the optimal capital-labor ratio. As the 
transition proceeds, the following conditions occur: 
i. the growth rate of 𝐾𝐹 declines when the employment share of E firms 
continues to increase; and 
ii. the aggregate capital accumulation is hump-shaped during the 
transition, hence 𝐾𝐹 grows when E firms’ employment share is small, 
and as the transition advances, 𝐾𝐹 growth rate declines until it turns 
negative. 
The decline in the growth rate of 𝐾𝐹 follows the subsequent equation: 
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(45) 
𝐾𝐹𝑡+1
𝐾𝐹𝑡
=
𝐴𝐹𝑡+1
𝐴𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑡+1
𝑁𝐹𝑡
= (1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)(
1 − 𝑁𝐸0𝑁0
(1 + 𝑣𝐸1 + 𝑣 )
𝑡+1
1 − 𝑁𝐸0𝑁0
(1 + 𝑣𝐸1 + 𝑣 )
𝑡 )
≡ 1 + 𝛾𝐾𝐹𝑡. 
From this, one can observe that 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
(1 + 𝛾𝐾𝐹𝑡) 
= (1 + 𝑧) 𝑁𝐸0
𝑁0
(1+𝑣𝐸
1+𝑣
)
𝑡
(ln 1+𝑣𝐸
1+𝑣
) (𝑣 − 𝑣𝐸) (1 − (
1+𝑣𝐸
1+𝑣
)
𝑡
)
−2
< 0 iff 𝑣𝐸 >  𝑣. 
The construct of equation (45) is presented in Appendix 17. As presented 
earlier, the aggregate capital accumulation is hump-shaped in the course of 
the transition; at the beginning, when the proportion of E firms is small and 
only a small share of labor is employed by E firms, 𝐾𝐹𝑡 grows at a positive 
but decreasing rate. This requires the population growth rate or technological 
growth rate to be positive (𝑣 > 0 or 𝑧 > 0, equivalently). Along the 
transition 𝐾𝐹𝑡 grows at a decreasing rate and ultimately turns negative. 
5.4 GDP per worker and average rate of 
return 
In the course of the transition, the growth rate of GDP per worker increases, 
provided that the condition 𝜒 > ?̂? holds. The aforesaid condition implies that 
the direction of resource reallocation is from less efficient F firms to efficient 
E firms. Hence this affects positively to the growth rate of GDP per worker, 
which is presented as follows: 
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(46) 𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
=
𝑌𝐹𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= 𝜅𝐹𝛼 (1 +
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝐴𝑡. 
The construct of equation (46) is presented in Appendix 18. 
Moreover, provided that condition 𝜒 > ?̂? holds, the average rate of return to 
capital increases in the course of the transition. Note that the rates of return 
to capital in both E and F firms are constant. Due to a composition effect, the 
average rate of return to capital is increasing in the economy. Note that 
owing to the condition that rate of return in E firms is higher than in F firms, 
the increasing average rate of return indicates that the share of E firms’ 
capital stock is increasing. The average rate of return during the transition is 
presented as follows: 
(47) 
𝜌𝑡 =
𝜌𝐸𝐾𝐸𝑡 + 𝜌𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑡
𝐾𝐸𝑡 + 𝐾𝐹𝑡
=
𝑅𝑙
1 − (1 − 𝜒((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼)𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
. 
The construct of equation (47) is presented in Appendix 19. 
  
52 
6. Foreign surplus, national savings and 
investments and financial 
development 
In this chapter, I present the country’s growing foreign surplus during the 
transition, along with the country’s increasing gross saving rate and 
decreasing gross investment rate. These are the focal points of the theory and 
they are consistent which the empirical evidence presented in chapter 3. First 
I present the accumulation of foreign surplus then the increasing national 
saving rate. In the third part of this chapter I present the decreasing national 
investment rate. In the last part I examine the role of financial development 
in the model. 
6.1 Accumulation of foreign surplus 
Consider, next, the relation of country’s financial system and the 
accumulation of foreign surplus. The balance sheet of banks can be 
presented as follows: 
(48) 
𝐾𝐹𝑡 +
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝐾𝐸𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1, 
where, following common custom, the banks’ assets are on the left side, 
while the banks’ liabilities are on the right side. The assets consists of 𝐾𝐹𝑡 
which refers to the loans to the F firms (F firms are financially 
unconstrained, hence the capital of F firms consists solely of loans from the 
banks), 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝐾𝐸𝑡 which refers to the loans for the E firms (this originates from 
equation (21), E firms are financially constrained, hence the capital is a 
53 
mixed combination of savings and loans), and  𝐵𝑡 which refers to the foreign 
bonds. Liabilities consist of 𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1 which refers to the savings of 
workers. After defining the banks’ balance sheet, equation (48) leads to the 
following lemma: 
Lemma 3  
Foreign surplus of the economy is presented as 
(49) 
𝐵𝑡 = (𝜁𝑊
(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝛼−1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 1 + (1 − 𝜂)
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡. 
In the course of the transition, the foreign surplus of the economy per 
efficiency unit ( 𝐵𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
) increases as E firms’ employment share (𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) increases. 
At the end of the transition, in period T, the country’s foreign surplus is as 
follows: 
𝐵𝑇 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝛼−1
((1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣))
− 𝜂)𝜅𝐹𝛼𝐴𝑇𝑁𝑇. 
At the end of the transition, when all workers are employed by E firms, the 
country’s foreign surplus will inevitably be positive if E firms remain enough 
credit constrained, i.e. 𝜂 is small.  
The proof of Lemma 3 is presented in Appendix 20. 
Note that the growth rates of a county’s foreign surplus and GDP can create 
the following phenomenon: if the growth rate of GDP is less than the growth 
rate of foreign surplus, then the foreign surplus-to-GDP ratio grows over 
time as follows: 
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(50) 
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
𝜁𝑊 (1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹
𝛼−1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣) − 1 + (1 − 𝜂)
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1 + 𝜓1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜅𝐹1−𝛼, 
which is increasing with 𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
 if:  
𝜓
1 − 𝜂(1 + 𝜓)
<
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
(1 − 𝛼)
1 + 𝛽−𝜃𝑅1−𝜃
𝑅𝑙
. 
The set of parameters is nonempty that satisfy this condition along with 
Assumption 1 and the condition of Lemma 2. The construct of equation (41) 
is presented in Appendix 21. Note that in order for this to occur, credit 
market discrimination and contractual imperfections needs to be serious 
enough, i.e. 𝜓 and 𝜂 would be sufficiently small.  
In summary, the country’s growing foreign surplus is caused by the contract 
of financially integrated F firms; more employment is being reallocated to 
productive E firms, hence the demand for domestic loans declines along with 
the decline of F firms, the banks must now focus more towards the foreign 
bonds. This link can be seen from equation (48). In the model, there lies the 
potential that E firms would increase their demand for domestic loans, but 
due to the financial sector’s inequality this would be negligible. 
6.2 Gross domestic saving rate 
In the course of the transition, the country’s gross saving rate grows over 
time. Gross domestic saving rate is presented as follows: 
𝑆𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝜁𝐸𝜇𝑚𝑡
𝑌𝑡
. 
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The growth in aggregate saving rate is due to the following circumstances: In 
F firms’ case, the workers save a fraction of 𝜁𝑊 of their earnings which is a 
constant share (1 − α) of the output. In E firms’ case, the workers of E firms 
save a fraction of 𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜓) of the output and young entrepreneurs 
save a share of 𝜓𝜁𝐸. The saving rate of the output equals the following: 
(1 − 𝛼)𝜁𝑊 + 𝛼𝜓𝜁𝐸 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜓(𝜁𝐸 − 𝜁𝑊). 
Since 𝜁𝐸 ≥ 𝜁𝑊, the saving rate of the output out of E firms exceeds the 
saving rate out of the output of F firms. This is due to the following: The 
equation (17) states that 𝜌𝐸 > 𝑅𝑙 and the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is restricted to 𝜃 ≥ 1. Hence the saving rate of young 
entrepreneurs (defined in equation (27)) is higher than the saving rate of 
workers (defined in equation (9)), i.e. 𝜁𝐸 ≥ 𝜁𝑊. 
6.3 Gross domestic investment rate 
The prediction that the aggregate investment rate falls in the course of the 
transition is being examined in this and in the following sections (6.3). Note 
that since the growing nature of aggregate saving rate during the transition, 
the model does not depend on the decreasing investment rate at this point. 
For simplicity, 𝑧 and 𝑣 are assumed to be zero. Hence, the employment, 
which is reallocated from F firms to E firms, needs less capital. Aggregate 
investments decrease in the course of the transition; this result generalizes to 
positive 𝑧 and 𝑣, respectively. Proposition 1 compresses the focal results 
thus far: 
Proposition 1 
Consider, next, that 𝜒 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝜒, ?̂?}. Thus, the equilibrium employment in 
the course of the transition is divided by E and F firms as follows: 
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(51) 
𝑁𝐸𝑡 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝐴𝑡𝜅𝐹(1 − 𝜓)
−1𝛼𝜒−
(1−𝛼)
𝛼 )
 
and 
𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡, 
where 𝜅𝐹 is presented in equation (30), and 𝐴𝑡 and 𝐾𝐸𝑡 are predetermined in 
period t. 
The rate of return to capital in F firms is 𝜌𝐹 = 𝑅𝑙. Accordingly, the rate of 
return to capital in E firms is 𝜌𝐸 = (1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙, as expressed in 
equation (16). Hence, the rate of return to capital is higher in E firms than in 
F firms. Moreover, the rate of return to capital is constant in E and F firms. 
Lemma 2 shows that E firms’ capital and employment grows over time. 
Lemma 3 shows that the stock of foreign assets per efficiency unit grows 
over time. Equation (50) shows that the foreign surplus-to-GDP ratio grows 
over time, if 𝜓 and/or 𝜂 are sufficiently small, hence contractual 
imperfections and/or asymmetric credit market are serious enough. 
The construct of equation (51) is presented in Appendix 22. 
6.4 Financial development 
In the standard neoclassical growth model, the investment rate falls because 
of capital deepening. The model of interest predicts also that in the course of 
the transition the investment rates fall. However, the falling investment rates 
are not caused by capital deepening, instead falling investment rates are 
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caused by the composition effect. As the transition proceeds, E firms expand 
in detriment of F firms; E firms are financially constrained and have a lower 
capital-output ratio than F firms which are financially unconstrained.  
As presented in section 3.4, the Chinese empirical evidence is against a 
falling investment rate. However, there is a possibility to moderate the 
theory so that there would be capital deepening for both E and F firms at the 
course of the transition by reducing the financial frictions. Note that the 
lending rate for domestic firms is presented in equation (7) as follows: 
𝑅𝑙 =
𝑅
(1 − 𝜉)
. 
Although the iceberg cost (i.e. 𝜉) has been assumed to be zero so far, it has a 
significant role in order to construct financial development into the theory: 
Financial development is modelled to the theory by decreasing 𝜉 as the 
transition proceeds. The decrease of 𝜉 causes the lending rate for domestic 
firms also to decrease. Decrease in both iceberg cost and lending rate cause 
the increase in wages in both F and E firms. Equivalently, the capital-output 
ratios in both F and E firms increase. 
The decrease in 𝜉 can have significant impacts on the model: it can alter the 
investment rate’s tendency to fall and hence increase the average rate of 
return to capital. This would slow down the transition in the following ways: 
i. the comparative advantage of F firms increases as the wages increase, 
ii. entrepreneurs increases the savings in order to attract F firms’ 
workers and 
iii. the rate of return to capital in E firms, 𝜌𝐸, reduces along with the 
entrepreneurs’ saving rate. 
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The reduction of 𝜉 is not the only method to incorporate financial 
development into the model. One way would be the model entrepreneurs’ 
better credit market access. In order to do this would be to reduce 𝜂, which 
incorporates the share that entrepreneurs promise to repay to the banks from 
the net profits of the second period. The reduction of 𝜂 would accelerate the 
transition, but would not have an effect to neither wages nor capital intensity 
of E firms (i.e. 𝜅𝐸). However, as shown in section 3.3, the Chinese empirical 
evidence does not clearly support of DPE’s improved access to the credit 
market.  
  
59 
7. Post-Transition Equilibrium 
In this chapter I present the post-transition equilibrium. As mentioned 
earlier, in period T, after the transition phase is over, the economy is 
dominated by E firms and all F firms have perished, hence all workers are 
employed by E firms. Also, once the transition phase ends, the theory 
follows and predicts by the dynamics of the standard OLG-model. 
So far the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has been restricted to 
𝜃 ≥ 1. Next, assume a case of log preferences, i.e. 𝜃 → 1. Now, the 
aggregate capital stock is as follows: 
(52) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
)(
𝑅𝑙
(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑡)
)𝑚𝑡. 
Under the log preferences, also the equilibrium wage is given by 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 , 
 rate of return to capital is given by 
(53) 𝜌𝑡 = 𝜌𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼−1, 
output is given by 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 , 
and foreign balance is given by 
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𝐵𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
=
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
=
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝜒(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 . 
Substituting the equilibrium expression of 𝑚𝑡 and equation (53) into 
equation (52) gives the standard neoclassical law of motion 
(54) 
𝜅𝐸𝑡+1 =
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸𝑡
𝛼−1 𝜅𝐸𝑡
𝛼 . 12 
If  
(55) 
𝛼(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓) >
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝜓𝑅
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
, 
then the standard neoclassical law of motion given in (54) ultimately 
converges to a steady state 
(56) 
𝜅𝐸∗ = (
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
+
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅
)
1
1−𝛼
. 
Note that in the steady state the condition 𝑅𝑙 = 𝑅 holds and the rate of 
return to capital in steady state is as follows: 
                                                 
12 The missing 𝜒 found from equation (40) is required in to construct of equation (54). 
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(57) 
𝜌𝐸∗ =
𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣) +
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅
. 
The construct of equations (52) and (54) is presented in Appendix 23, the 
construct of equation (56) is presented in Appendix 24 and the construct of 
equation (57) is presented in Appendix 25. According to condition (55), the 
steady state rate of return to capital is larger than gross return to foreign 
bonds, i.e.  𝜌𝐸∗ > 𝑅. Entrepreneurs do not find it appealing to invest in 
foreign bonds. Stated otherwise: entrepreneurs never invest in foreign 
bonds. If this would not be the case, entrepreneurs would deposit part of 
their savings in banks. 
In the converging path, the rate of return to capital falls; capital deepening 
causes the rate of return to capital to fall to 𝑅𝑙 or the capital per effective 
unit of labor converges to a steady state where the rate of return to capital is 
larger than the 𝑅𝑙. However, in the converging path, the foreign surplus, 
wages per effective unit and output per effective unit all increases.  
  
62 
8. Conclusions 
This chapter concludes this thesis by answering the key research questions. It 
also presents the results and main elements of the model built. I discuss the 
main assumptions and results of the model along with the features of China’s 
transition presented in chapter three and point out the contradictions between 
the model and empirical evidence. 
In this thesis, I reviewed the central features of China’s transition, most 
notably the resource reallocation from the state-owned sector to the private 
sector, productivity differences between the state-owned and private 
enterprises, moderate wage growth and rising income inequality, asymmetric 
financial imperfections and the central macroeconomic indicators: 
accumulation of foreign surplus and high aggregate investment and saving 
rates. With the aid of a theoretical model, I characterized the nature of 
China’s transition. Moreover, while I was calculating the model through, few 
inconsistencies were found and subsequently recognized by professors Song, 
Storesletten and Zilibotti. The inconsistencies found are corrected in this 
thesis (see the footnotes from pages 44, 46 and 60). 
In the model E firms refer to the private enterprises, and accordingly, F firms 
refer to the state-owned enterprises. The main assumptions of the model are 
firm-level heterogeneity in productivity and asymmetric financial market 
discrimination. E firms are more productive, but due to the discrimination of 
the financial sector they must rely on entrepreneurial savings, while F firms 
are less productive, but survive in the equilibrium due to the external 
financing. If the entrepreneurial savings are large enough E firms gradually 
outgrow F firms. During the transition phase both enterprise types have 
sustained returns to capital due to labor mobility and financial integration of 
F firms. Low wage growth sustains the rate of return to capital. Interestingly, 
the aggregate rate of return to capital increases due to composition effect. 
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The wage earners deposit their earnings into banks, which can either invest 
into domestic firms or foreign bonds. As the volume of F firms decrease the 
financial sector invests a higher amount into foreign bonds causing the 
foreign surplus to increase. After the transition is over, the economy is 
dominated by E enterprises and capital accumulation is subject to 
diminishing return to capital. 
As presented in chapter three, the following features that characterize the 
difference between private and state-owned enterprises are well documented: 
SOEs depend more on external financing due to their better access to state-
owned banks and hence credit markets, DPEs are financially discriminated 
and rely more on self-funding and SOEs are weak in corporate governance. 
Moreover, during the transition phase, the model behaves similar to China’s 
growth experience presented in chapter three: the rate of return to capital 
does not fall in the course of the transition despite of high investment and 
growth in production; Lemma 1 indicates a lower capital to output and 
capital to labor ratios for E firms, which stems from higher TFP and 
limitations to access external funding of the E firms; E firms have a higher 
rate of return to capital than do F firms; factor reallocation from E firms to F 
firms during the transition phase; factor reallocation causes external 
imbalances as financially integrated firms diminish while financially 
constrained firms increase and the inequality between raising entrepreneurs’ 
earnings and the moderate wages growth of workers. 
However, as presented in chapter three, the following features are in 
contradiction with China’s growth experience: frictionless labor market, 
financial market laissez-faire environment, competitive F firms and the 
prediction that F firms fully disappears from the economy. As presented in 
chapter three, the labor market in China is characterized by huge frictions 
(i.e. hukou system), but the labor market is assumed to be frictionless and 
competitive in the model. However, the absence of the labor market frictions 
64 
does not affect the model’s qualitative predictions. Insertion of labor market 
frictions into the model would affect the rate of reallocation and wage 
growth. Moreover, in contradiction to the evidence presented in section 3.2, 
the capital controls deteriorate the interaction between the Chinese financial 
sector and the international financial sector, but in the model the banks are 
perfectly integrated in international financial markets. For simplicity, the 
government is assumed to have no role in monetary policy (i.e. altering the 
exchange or interest rates). The contradictions of labor market and laissez-
faire environment of financial market are confronted in the extensions by 
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) and Song, Stroresletten and Zilibotti (2014), 
respectively. 
The assumption that F firms are competitive stems from the enterprise sector 
reforms started in the 1990s. The purpose was not to privatize the whole 
economy, but to retain the largest state-owned enterprises and force the 
smaller state-owned enterprises to either compete in the marketplace or to 
default. Hence F firms are assumed to be competitive profit-maximizing 
firms. However, this assumption blocks the other institutional features that 
characterize SOEs: market power and the objectives of SOEs and their 
managers that may be fundamental in China’s paradigm. Also, the prediction 
that SOEs fully disappear from the economy is not supported by data.  
To confront the above mentioned phenomena, Song et al. (2011) extended 
the model into a two-sector environment, where industries are divided into 
capital- and labor-intensive industries. In the model of this thesis, E and F 
firms differ in productivity, but produce the same good. In the extension, E 
firms have an endogenous comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
industries due to the credit-market discrimination. The comparative 
advantage generates E firms to specialize in labor-intensive industries. The 
transition advances in stages: in the first stage both firms are investing into 
labor-intensive sector, but only F firms are investing in the capital-intensive 
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sector. As the transition advances, F firms first retreat into the capital-
intensive sector and gradually vanish also from the capital-intensive sector as 
E firms start to invest into both sectors. Finally the economy is as in post-
transition equilibrium (chapter 7), where only E firms exists. Song et al. 
(2011) also extended the two-sector model into a model, where the capital-
intensive sector is monopolized by a large F firm while the labor-intensive 
sector is competitive. As the transition proceeds, labor-intensive sector’s 
productivity increases as does demand for the capital-intensive goods along 
with the profit of the monopolist.  
Despite of a number of simplifications, the model gives a clear qualitative 
explanation to China’s puzzling phenomena of sustained return to capital and 
growing foreign surplus. The simplifications allow the model to focus on the 
main differences between E and F firms, that is to say the heterogeneity in 
productivity and asymmetric financial imperfections. Overall, the model 
presented captures the main features of China’s transition. This is not only 
done in qualitative fashion, but also quantitatively: Song et al. (2011) 
showed that a calibrated version of the model is also consistent with the 
features of China’s growth story. The model successfully mimics much of 
China’s growth experience, most notably the raising inequality between the 
workers and the entrepreneurs, firm-level productivity differences, 
reallocation of resources from low-productivity enterprises to high-
productivity enterprises, high return to capital despite of high capital 
accumulation, financial market imperfections and accumulation of foreign 
surplus. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. The conduct of equation (5) 
Period 1 budget constraint is as follows: 
𝑐1𝑡𝑊 + 𝑠𝑡𝑊 = 𝑤𝑡. 
Period 2 budget constraint is as follows: 
𝑐2𝑡𝑊 = 𝑅𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑊 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 =
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
. 
Placing this into period 1 budget constraint, one gets the intertemporal 
budget constraint 
𝑐1𝑡𝑊 +
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
= 𝑤𝑡. 
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Appendix 2. The construct of equation (6) 
The Lagrange function is as follows: 
ℒ =
𝑐1𝑡
(𝑊)1−
1
𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝛽
𝑐2𝑡
(𝑊)1−
1
𝜃 − 1 
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝜆 (𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐1𝑡𝑊 +
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
). 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) are 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐1𝑡
𝑊 = 𝑐1𝑡
(𝑊)−
1
𝜃 − 𝜆 = 0 ⇔  𝜆 = 𝑐1𝑡
(𝑊)−
1
𝜃 , 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐2𝑡
𝑊 = 𝛽𝑐2𝑡
(𝑊)−
1
𝜃 −
𝜆
𝑅𝑑
= 0 ⇔ 𝜆 = 𝑅𝑑𝛽𝑐2𝑡
(𝑊)−
1
𝜃, 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆
= 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐1𝑡𝑊 +
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
= 0. 
Combining the first two gives 
𝑐1𝑡
(𝑊)−
1
𝜃 = 𝑅𝑑𝛽𝑐2𝑡
(𝑊)−
1
𝜃 
𝑐1𝑡𝑊 = 𝑅(𝑑)
−𝜃
𝛽−𝜃𝑐2𝑡𝑊. 
Inserting this into third FOC yields 
𝑤𝑡 − (𝑅(𝑑)
−𝜃
𝛽−𝜃𝑐2𝑡𝑊) −
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
= 0 
𝑅(𝑑)
−𝜃
𝛽−𝜃𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑐2𝑡𝑊
𝑅𝑑
= 𝑤𝑡 
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𝑐2𝑡𝑊 (𝑅(𝑑)
−𝜃
𝛽−𝜃 +
1
𝑅𝑑
) = 𝑤𝑡 
𝑐2𝑡𝑊 (
𝑅𝑑𝑅(𝑑)
−𝜃
𝛽−𝜃 + 1
𝑅𝑑
) = 𝑤𝑡 
𝑐2𝑡𝑊 = 𝑤𝑡 (
𝑅(𝑑)
1−𝜃
𝛽−𝜃 + 1
𝑅𝑑
)
−1
. 
Plugging this into period 2 budget constraint, (4), gives the optimal savings 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 =
𝑤𝑡 (
𝑅(𝑑)
1−𝜃
𝛽−𝜃 + 1
𝑅𝑑 )
−1
𝑅𝑑
 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 =
𝑤𝑡 (
𝑅𝑑
𝑅(𝑑)1−𝜃𝛽−𝜃 + 1
)
𝑅𝑑
 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 =
𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑑
𝑅𝑑 (𝑅(𝑑)1−𝜃𝛽−𝜃 + 1)
 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 = 𝑤𝑡 (
1
𝑅(𝑑)1−𝜃𝛽−𝜃 + 1
) 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 = 𝑤𝑡 (1 + 𝛽−𝜃𝑅(𝑑)
1−𝜃
)
−1
 
𝑠𝑡𝑊 = 𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡, 
where 𝜁𝑊 = (1 + 𝛽−𝜃𝑅(𝑑)1−𝜃)
−1
. 
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Appendix 3. The construct of equation (9) 
As stated earlier, the lending rate for domestic firms, 𝑅𝑙, is equal to the 
marginal product of capital. With simple algebra one obtains the following: 
𝑅𝑙 = 𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼−1(𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼 
𝑅𝑙
𝑛𝐹𝑡
1−𝛼 = 𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴𝑡1−𝛼 
𝑛𝐹𝑡1−𝛼
𝑅𝑙
=
1
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼 
𝑛𝐹𝑡1−𝛼 =
𝑅𝑙
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼 
𝑛𝐹𝑡 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼)
1
1−𝛼
. 
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Appendix 4. The construct of equation (11) 
Equivalently, as stated before, wages equals to the marginal product of labor. 
Substituting 𝑛𝐹𝑡 by plugging the equation (9) into the formula yields the 
equilibrium wages as follows: 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡 (𝐴𝑡 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼)
1
1−𝛼
)
−𝛼
 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)
𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼)
− 𝛼1−𝛼
 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡1−𝛼
(
 
 1
( 𝑅
𝑙
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼)
𝛼
1−𝛼
)
 
 
 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡1−𝛼 (
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼−1𝐴𝑡1−𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡1−𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼(𝛼−1)
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡
𝛼(1−𝛼)
1−𝛼 (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼
1−𝛼−
𝛼(1−𝛼)
1−𝛼 +
𝛼(1−𝛼)
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼(1−𝛼)
1−𝛼 +
𝛼(𝛼−1)
1−𝛼 (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡1𝑘𝐹𝑡0 (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡. 
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Appendix 5. The construct of equation (14) 
Plugging (11) and (13) into (12) gives 
   max
 𝑛𝐸𝑡
{𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼 − (𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (χ𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼) − ((1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡)𝑛𝐸𝑡}. 
Taking the FOC with respect to 𝑛𝐸𝑡 gives 
𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)−𝛼 − 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)−𝛼
− (1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡 = 0 
𝑛𝐸𝑡−𝛼(𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)−𝛼 − 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)−𝛼)
= (1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡 
𝑛𝐸𝑡−𝛼 =
(1 − 𝛼) (𝛼𝑅𝑙)
𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡
(𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)−𝛼 − 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)−𝛼)
 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 =
(
 
(1 − 𝛼) (𝛼𝑅𝑙)
𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡
(𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)−𝛼 − 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)(𝜒𝐴𝑡)−𝛼)
)
 
−1𝛼
 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 =
(1 − 𝛼)−
1
𝛼 (𝛼𝑅𝑙)
− 11−𝛼 𝐴𝑡
−1𝛼
𝑘𝐸𝑡
−1(1 − 𝛼)−
1
𝛼(𝜒𝐴𝑡)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡 − 𝜓
−1𝛼𝑘𝐸𝑡
−1(1 − 𝛼)−
1
𝛼(𝜒𝐴𝑡)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 =
1
(𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡
1
𝛼
𝜒𝐴𝑡
𝑘𝐸𝑡(𝜒𝐴𝑡)
1
𝛼
− 𝜒𝐴𝑡
𝜓
1
𝛼𝑘𝐸𝑡(𝜒𝐴𝑡)
1
𝛼
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𝑛𝐸𝑡 =
1
(𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡
1
𝛼
(
𝑘𝐸𝑡(𝜒𝐴𝑡)
1
𝛼 − 𝜓
1
𝛼𝑘𝐸𝑡(𝜒𝐴𝑡)
1
𝛼
𝜒𝐴𝑡
) 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 =
𝑘𝐸𝑡𝜒
1
𝛼 − 𝜓
1
𝛼𝑘𝐸𝑡𝜒
1
𝛼
(𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 =
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼𝑘𝐸𝑡
( 𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 =
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼
(𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼
(
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
) 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 = ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
. 
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Appendix 6. The construct of equation (16)  
After plugging the equations (13), (11), and (14) into equation (12) and 
modifying the equation as follows yields to the value of E firm: 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = 𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡 (((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
))
1−𝛼
−
(
 𝜓𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (χ𝐴𝑡 (((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
))
1−𝛼
)
 
− ((1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡)(((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
) 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = (1 − 𝜓)𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡)1−𝛼 (((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
)
1−𝛼
− ((1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡)(((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
) 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = (1 − 𝜓)𝑘𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡)1−𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
) (
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
)
1−𝛼
− (1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐴𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = (1 − 𝜓)
𝛼+1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝛼+(1−𝛼)𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
− (1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼
𝑘𝐸𝑡 
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Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = (1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
− (1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡(1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
(
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼
 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = ((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡)((
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
) − (1 − 𝛼) (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
(
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼
) 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = ((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡)
(
 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
) − (
(1 − 𝛼)𝑅(𝑙)
1
1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝑅(𝑙)
𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
1
1−𝛼
)
)
  
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = ((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡)((
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
) − ((1 − 𝛼)𝑅(𝑙)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼−1
1−𝛼)) 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = ((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡)
(
 
 
(
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
) − ((1 − 𝛼) (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
)
)
 
 
 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = ((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡) (
𝑅𝑙 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝑙
𝛼
) 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = ((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡) (
𝑅𝑙 − 𝑅𝑙 + 𝛼𝑅𝑙
𝛼
) 
Ξ(𝑘𝐸𝑡) = (1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡𝑅𝑙. 
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Appendix 7. The construct of equation (21) 
Using simple algebra, the incentive-compatibility constraint can be presented 
as follows: 
𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐸 ≤ 𝜂𝜌𝐸(𝑠𝐸 + 𝑙𝐸) 
𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐸
(𝑠𝐸 + 𝑙𝐸)
≤ 𝜂𝜌𝐸  
𝑙𝐸
(𝑠𝐸 + 𝑙𝐸)
≤
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
 
𝑙𝐸
(𝑠𝐸 + 𝑙𝐸)
=
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
. 
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Appendix 8. The construct of equation (24) 
By using simple algebra, equation (21) can be expressed as follows: 
𝑅𝑙𝑙𝐸 = 𝜂𝜌𝐸(𝑠𝐸 + 𝑙𝐸) 
𝑙𝐸(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸) = 𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸 
𝑙𝐸 =
𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
. 
Plugging 𝑙𝐸 into equation (23) gives 
 𝑐2 = 𝜌𝐸 (
𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
+ 𝑠𝐸) − 𝑅𝑙 (
𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
) 
 𝑐2 =
𝜂𝜌𝐸2𝑠𝐸
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
+
𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝑅𝑙)
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
−
𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
 
 𝑐2 =
𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
 
 𝑐2 =
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸. 
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Appendix 9. The construct of equation (26) 
max
𝑠𝐸
(𝑚 − 𝑠𝐸)
1−1𝜃 − 1
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝛽
(
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸)
1−1𝜃
− 1
1 − 1𝜃
. 
Taking the FOC with respect to 𝑠𝐸 gives 
−(1 − 1𝜃) (𝑚 − 𝑠𝐸)
−1𝜃
1 − 1𝜃
+ 𝛽
(1 − 1𝜃) (1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅
𝑙 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸)
−1𝜃
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
1 − 1𝜃
= 0 
−(𝑚 − 𝑠𝐸)
−1𝜃 + 𝛽
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸)
−1𝜃
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
= 0 
−𝑚 + 𝑠𝐸 + 𝛽−𝜃
((1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙)
−𝜃 (1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸
(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸)−𝜃
= 0 
−𝑚 + 𝑠𝐸 + (
𝛽−𝜃((1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙)
−𝜃
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸) (
1
(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸)−𝜃
) = 0 
−𝑚 + 𝑠𝐸 + (
𝛽−𝜃((1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙)
1−𝜃
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑠𝐸) (
1
(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸)−𝜃
) = 0 
−𝑚 + 𝑠𝐸 + (
𝛽−𝜃((1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙)
1−𝜃
(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸)1−𝜃
𝑠𝐸) = 0 
𝑠𝐸 (1 +
𝛽−𝜃((1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙)
1−𝜃
(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸)1−𝜃
) = 𝑚 
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𝑠𝐸 = 𝑚(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
. 
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Appendix 10. The construct of equation (30) 
Modifying the equation (8) gives  
𝑅𝑙 = 𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡𝛼−1(𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼 
𝑅𝑙 = 𝛼 (
𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡
𝑘𝐹𝑡
)
1−𝛼
 
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
= (
𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡
𝑘𝐹𝑡
)
1−𝛼
 
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
= (
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡
)
1−𝛼
 
(
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
1−𝛼
=
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡
 
Now plugging equation (28) into the equation above gives equation (30): 
𝜅𝐹 = (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
1−𝛼
. 
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Appendix 11. The construct of equation (32) 
Modifying the equation (14) as follows gives 
𝑛𝐸𝑡 = ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
1 = ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡
 
1
𝑘𝐸𝑡
= ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼 1
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡
 
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡
𝑘𝐸𝑡
= ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (
𝑅𝑙
𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼
 
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡
= ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼 (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
1
1−𝛼
. 
Then plugging the equations (29) and (30) into the equation above yields 
𝜅𝐸𝑡 = 𝜅𝐹𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼. 
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Appendix 12. The construct of equation (33) 
In order to clarify equation (33), I first calculate the left-side and then the 
right-side of the equation. 
(33) 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝑦𝐸𝑡
= 𝜅𝐸𝑡1−𝛼 < 𝜅𝐹𝑡1−𝛼 =
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝑦𝐹𝑡
. 
By first plugging equation (3) into the left-side of equation (33) and using 
the expression of capital per effective unit of labor for E firms from equation 
(29) yields 
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝑦𝐸𝑡
=
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼
=
𝑘𝐸𝑡1−𝛼
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼
= (
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡
)
1−𝛼
= 𝜅𝐸𝑡1−𝛼. 
Similarly, plugging the equation (2) into the right-side of equation (33) and 
using the expression of capital per effective unit of labor for F firms from 
equation (28) yields 
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝑦𝐹𝑡
=
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼 (𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼
=
𝑘𝐹𝑡1−𝛼
(𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼
= (
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐹𝑡
)
1−𝛼
= 𝜅𝐹𝑡1−𝛼. 
Hence 
𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝑦𝐸𝑡
= 𝜅𝐸𝑡1−𝛼 < 𝜅𝐹𝑡1−𝛼 =
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝑦𝐹𝑡
. 
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Appendix 13. The construct of equation (34) 
First by plugging the expressions of 𝑛𝐹 and 𝑛𝐸  from equations (9) and (14) 
into the left-side of equation (34) yields the following: 
𝑘𝐹
𝑛𝐹
𝑘𝐸
𝑛𝐸
 
=
𝑘𝐹
( 𝑅
𝑙
𝛼𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1𝐴1−𝛼
)
1
1−𝛼
𝑘𝐸
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼 (𝑅
𝑙
𝛼 )
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
=
𝑘𝐹
(𝑅
𝑙
𝛼 )
1
1−𝛼 1
𝑘𝐹𝑡
𝛼−1
1−𝛼𝐴𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑘𝐸𝑡
𝑘𝐸𝑡
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼 (𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼
 
=
(𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼 𝑘𝐹𝑡
1−𝛼+(𝛼−1)
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡
( 𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼 ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼
 
Now using the expressions of 𝜅𝐹𝑡 and 𝜅𝐸𝑡 from equations (30) and (32) 
yields 
=
𝜅𝐹𝑡 𝐴𝑡
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
Now by plugging the equation (32) yields 
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=
𝜅𝐹𝑡 𝐴𝑡
𝜅𝐹𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡
 
=
1
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒
 
=
1
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒
−1+𝛼
𝛼
 
=
𝜒−(
−1+𝛼
𝛼 )
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼
 
=
𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼
( 1(1 − 𝜓))
1
𝛼
. 
Now using the equation (18) from Assumption 1 (i.e. 𝜒 > 𝜒 ≡ ( 1
1−𝜓
)
1
1−𝛼) 
yields 
(
𝜒
𝜒
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
, 
since 
𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 = [(
1
1 − 𝜓
)
1
1−𝛼
]
1−𝛼
𝛼
= (
1
1 − 𝜓
)
(1−𝛼)
(1−𝛼)𝛼
= (
1
1 − 𝜓
)
1
𝛼
. 
Hence 
88 
 𝑘𝐹
𝑛𝐹
𝑘𝐸
𝑛𝐸
=
𝜅𝐹
𝐴
𝜅𝐸
𝜒𝐴
= (
𝜒
𝜒
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
. 
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Appendix 14. The construct of equation (39)  
Plugging the modified equation (21) (see Appendix 8) into equation (38) 
yields 
(38) 𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝐸 + 𝑙𝑡𝐸  
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝐸 +
𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑠𝐸
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
 
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝐸 (1 +
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
) 
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝐸 (
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸 + 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
) 
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝐸 (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
). 
Next, by plugging 𝑠𝑡𝐸 from equation (26) yields 
(39) 
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝑚𝑡. 
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Appendix 15. The construct of equation (40) 
Plugging equation (13) by replacing 𝑚𝑡 yields 
(39) 
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝑚𝑡 
𝑘𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝜓(𝑘𝐸𝑡)𝛼(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑛𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼. 
Then, aggregating over all entrepreneurs yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝜓(𝐾𝐸𝑡)𝛼(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝜓(𝐾𝐸𝑡)𝛼(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡)−𝛼(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝜓 (
𝐾𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
)
𝛼
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡). 
Using the expression of 𝜅𝐸𝑡 from equation (29) yields 
(40) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝜓𝜅𝐸𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
 
 
  
91 
Appendix 16. Proof of Lemma 2 
(40) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜁𝐸𝜓𝜅𝐸𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
Substituting 𝜁𝐸  by plugging equation (27) into equation (40) yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
)(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓𝜅𝐸𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
Dividing the both side of the equation by 𝐾𝐸𝑡 yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
)(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓𝜅𝐸𝛼
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝐾𝐸𝑡
. 
Using the expression of 𝜅𝐸𝑡 by plugging equation (32) yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓((
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
1
1−𝛼
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼)
𝛼
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝐾𝐸𝑡
 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓((
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
1
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−
1
𝛼)
𝛼
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝐾𝐸𝑡
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𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓 (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝜓)−1𝜒−1
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝐾𝐸𝑡
 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
(
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝐾𝐸𝑡
 
Using the modified equation (35) to substitute 𝐾𝐸𝑡 yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
(
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
)(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
(
𝛼
𝑅𝑙
)
𝛼
1−𝛼 1
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒
. 
Again, using the expression of 𝜅𝐸𝑡 by plugging equation (32) yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)
(
 
 (
𝛼
𝑅𝑙)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝜒 (𝛼𝑅𝑙)
1
1−𝛼 ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼
)
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𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)(
𝛼
𝛼
1−𝛼𝑅(𝑙)
1
1−𝛼
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
1
𝛼
𝜒𝑅(𝑙)
𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
1
1−𝛼
) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)(
𝛼
𝛼
1−𝛼𝑅(𝑙)
1
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑅(𝑙)
𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
1
1−𝛼
) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)(
𝛼
𝛼
1−𝛼𝑅(𝑙)
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝛼
1
1−𝛼
) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)(
𝛼
𝛼
1−𝛼𝑅𝑙(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝛼
𝛼
1
1−𝛼𝛼
) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
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∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)(
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙𝛼
𝛼+(1−𝛼)
1−𝛼
𝛼
1
1−𝛼𝛼
) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)(
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙
𝛼
𝛼
1)
1−𝛼
𝛼
1
1−𝛼
) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝐾𝐸𝑡
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
(
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
)(
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙
𝛼
). 
Now, one needs to recall that condition 𝑣𝐸 > 𝑣 is equivalent to 
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
𝜌𝐸
𝛼
> (1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧). 
In order to proceed the proof of lemma 2, one needs to use the following 
fact: 
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙𝜌𝐸
 
=
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙𝜌𝐸
−
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙𝜌𝐸
 
=
1
𝜌𝐸
−
𝜂
𝑅𝑙
. 
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Next, plugging in the expression of 𝜌𝐸 from equation (16) gives 
=
1
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙
−
𝜂
𝑅𝑙
 
=
1
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼
1
𝑅𝑙
−
𝜂
𝑅𝑙
 
=
1
𝑅𝑙
(
1
(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼𝜒
1−𝛼
𝛼
− 𝜂) 
=
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂. 
First, by rearranging the condition 𝑣𝐸 > 𝑣 and using the above defined fact 
gives 
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
𝜌𝐸
𝛼
> (1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧) 
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
(1 + 𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 (
𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
𝜌𝐸
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> 1 
𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
(1 + 𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 (
𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> 1 
𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
(1 + 𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 (
𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> 1 
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(
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂)
−1
 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 ((
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂)
−1
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
 
∙
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> 1 
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> 
(
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 ((
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂)
−1
)
1−𝜃
) 
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> 
(
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂) 
∙ (1 + 𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 (
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂)
𝜃−1
) 
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> (
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂) 
+𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 (
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂)
𝜃
. 
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One can see that the right-side of the equation is monotonically decreasing in 
𝜒 and the left-side is constant. Since right-side tends to ∞ (0) as 𝜒 → 0 (∞), 
a unique ?̂? exists such that: 
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
1
𝛼(1 + 𝑣)(1 + 𝑧)
> (
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼?̂?−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂) 
+𝛽−𝜃(1 − 𝜂)1−𝜃 (
1
𝑅𝑙
(1 − 𝜓)−
1
𝛼?̂?−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ) − 𝜂)
𝜃
. 
Hence, the condition 𝑣𝐸 > 𝑣 is satisfied when 𝜒 > ?̂?. This leads to the 
following results: 
i. The right-side is decreasing in 𝛽, 𝜂 and 𝑅𝑙. The inequality holds for 
sufficiently large 𝛽, 𝜂 and 𝑅𝑙. 
ii. Left-side side is decreasing in 𝑣 and 𝑧. Hence, the condition 𝑣𝐸 > 𝑣 
is satisfied for sufficiently small 𝑣 and 𝑧. 
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Appendix 17. The construct of equation (45) 
Plugging equation (36) into equation (44) yields 
𝐾𝐹𝑡 = 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐹𝑡 
Now, plugging this into equation (45) yields 
𝐾𝐹𝑡+1
𝐾𝐹𝑡
 
=
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑡+1
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑡+1
𝑁𝐹𝑡
. 
Now, plugging equation (36) yields 
=
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑡+1
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡
. 
Next, recall that 𝐴𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑧)𝐴𝑡. Plugging this into the equation yields 
=
(1 + 𝑧)𝐴𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡
 
= (1 + 𝑧) (
𝑁𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡
) 
Now, recall that 𝑁𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑣)𝑁𝑡. Equivalently, plugging this into the 
equation yields 
= (1 + 𝑧) (
(1 + 𝑣)𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡
) 
99 
= (1 + 𝑧)(
(1 + 𝑣) − 𝑁𝐸𝑡+1𝑁𝑡
1 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
) 
= (1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)(
1 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡+1(1 + 𝑣)𝑁𝑡
1 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
) 
= (1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
(
 
1 − [
(1 + 𝑣𝐸)
(1 + 𝑣) ]
𝑡+1 𝑁𝐸0
𝑁0
1 − [
(1 + 𝑣𝐸)
(1 + 𝑣) ]
𝑡 𝑁𝐸0
𝑁0 )
 . 
Note that for 𝑁𝐸𝑡: 
𝑁𝐸𝑡 = 𝑁𝐸0(1 + 𝑣𝐸)𝑡, 
𝑁𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑁𝐸0(1 + 𝑣𝐸)𝑡+1, 
𝑁𝐸𝑡+2 = 𝑁𝐸0(1 + 𝑣𝐸)𝑡+2, 
⋮ 
Equivalently, note that for 𝑁𝑡: 
𝑁𝑡 = 𝑁0(1 + 𝑣𝐸)𝑡, 
𝑁𝑡+1 = 𝑁0(1 + 𝑣𝐸)𝑡+1, 
𝑁𝑡+2 = 𝑁0(1 + 𝑣𝐸)𝑡+2, 
⋮ 
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Appendix 18. The construct of equation (46) 
First, by defining the expressions of 𝑌𝐹𝑡 and 𝑌𝐸𝑡 one can move into the 
construction of equation (46). The aggregated 𝑌𝐹𝑡 is defined as 
𝑌𝐹𝑡 = 𝐾𝐹𝑡𝛼 (𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐹𝑡)1−𝛼. 
Then, plugging the equation (36) yields 
𝑌𝐹𝑡 = 𝐾𝐹𝑡𝛼 (𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡))
1−𝛼
 
𝑌𝐹𝑡 = 𝐾𝐹𝑡𝛼 (𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡))−𝛼(𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)) 
𝑌𝐹𝑡 = (
𝐾𝐹𝑡
𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
)
𝛼
(𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)). 
Using the aggregated expression of equation (28) yields 
𝑌𝐹𝑡 = 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 (𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)). 
The aggregated 𝑌𝐸𝑡 is similarly defined as 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 = 𝐾𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡)1−𝛼 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 = 𝐾𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡)−𝛼(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡) 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 = (
𝐾𝐸𝑡
𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
)
𝛼
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡). 
Using the aggregated expression equation (29) yields 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 = 𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 (𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡). 
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Now, plugging equation (32) gives the following: 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 = (𝜅𝐹𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼)
𝛼
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡) 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 = 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 ((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡) 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 =
𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
 
𝑌𝐸𝑡 =
𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
1 − 𝜓
. 
Next, by using the above expressions for 𝑌𝐹𝑡 and 𝑌𝐸𝑡 in order to create the 
equation (46) gives  
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
=
𝑌𝐹𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
 
=
𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 (𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)) +
𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡
1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝑡
 
= 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡 (
(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡) +
𝑁𝐸𝑡
1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝑡
) 
= 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡 (
𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑡
−
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
+
𝑁𝐸𝑡
(1 − 𝜓)𝑁𝑡
) 
= 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡 (1 +
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
(−1 +
1
(1 − 𝜓)
)) 
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= 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡 (1 +
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
(
−(1 − 𝜓) + 1
(1 − 𝜓)
)) 
= 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡 (1 +
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
). 
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Appendix 19. The construct of equation (47) 
First, modifying the equation (35) yields 
𝜅𝐸𝑡 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡)
 
𝐾𝐸𝑡 = 𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
Now, plugging the expression of 𝜅𝐸 from equation (32) gives 
𝐾𝐸𝑡 = 𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
Next, plugging the above equation along with equation (44) into (47) yields 
(47) 
𝜌𝑡 =
𝜌𝐸𝐾𝐸𝑡 + 𝜌𝐹𝐾𝐹𝑡
𝐾𝐸𝑡 + 𝐾𝐹𝑡
 
=
𝜌𝐸𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝜌𝐹𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
 
Using the definition of 𝜌𝐸 from equation (16) yields 
𝜌𝑡 =
((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼χ
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙) 𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝜌𝐹𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
. 
Using the fact that 𝜌𝐹 = 𝑅𝑙 gives 
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𝜌𝑡 =
((1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼χ
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙) 𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝑙𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
 
=
(1 − 𝜓)
1−1
𝛼 χ
1−𝛼+𝛼−1
𝛼 𝑅𝑙𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝑙𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 + 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
 
=
𝑅𝑙𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝑙𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 + 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
 
=
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑅𝑙𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝑙(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡))
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡 (𝑁𝐸𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 + (𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡))
 
=
𝑅𝑙𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝑅𝑙𝑁𝑡 − 𝑅𝑙𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 + (𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
 
=
𝑅𝑙𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 + (𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
 
=
𝑅𝑙𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑡 (1 +
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
)
 
=
𝑅𝑙
1 + 𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
 
=
𝑅𝑙
1 + 𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
(((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒 − 1)
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=
𝑅𝑙
1 − (1 − 𝜒((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼)𝑁𝐸𝑡𝑁𝑡
. 
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Appendix 20. The proof of Lemma 3 
Plugging the modified equation (35) (i.e. 𝐾𝐸𝑡 = 𝜅𝐸𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡) and the equation 
(32) (i.e. 𝐾𝐹𝑡 = 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)) into the equation (48) yields 
𝐾𝐹𝑡 +
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝐾𝐸𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1 
𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡) +
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1 − 𝜅𝐹𝐴𝑡(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡) −
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
− 𝜅𝐹
(𝑁𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝑡)
𝑁𝑡
−
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊𝑤𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) −
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡. 
Modifying and plugging the equation (11) in past time form (i.e. 𝑤𝑡−1) 
yields 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼 𝐴𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) −
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
𝐴𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) −
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡. 
Next, one knows that 
𝐴𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
=
1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
. 
By plugging the above expression into the expression for 𝐵𝑡 yields: 
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𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) −
𝜂𝜌𝐸
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝑡𝜒𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡. 
Plugging the definition of 𝜌𝐸 from equation (16) yields 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸
𝑁𝑡
) −
𝜂(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼χ
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙
𝜅𝐸𝜒𝑁𝐸
𝑁𝑡
)𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸
𝑁𝑡
) −
𝑁𝐸
𝑁𝑡
𝜂(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼χ
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝜅𝐸𝜒)𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡. 
Using equation (32) to substitute 𝜅𝐸 yields 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
−
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜂(1 − 𝜓)
1
𝛼χ
1−𝛼
𝛼 𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼𝜒)𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
−
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜂𝜅𝐹(1 − 𝜓)
1−1
𝛼 χ
1−𝛼−1
𝛼 𝜒)𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
−
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜂𝜅𝐹(1 − 𝜓)
1−1
𝛼 χ
1−𝛼−1+𝛼
𝛼 )𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 𝜅𝐹 (1 −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) −
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜂𝜅𝐹)𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼−1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 1 +
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
−
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝜂) 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 
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𝐵𝑡 = (
𝜁𝑊(1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹𝑡𝛼−1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
− 1 + (1 − 𝜂)
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡. 
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Appendix 21. The construct of equation (41) 
Using the expressions (49) and (46) for 𝐵𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡, respectively, gives 
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
(𝜁𝑊 (1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹
𝛼−1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣) − 1 + (1 − 𝜂)
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝜅𝐹𝑡𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝜅𝐹𝑡
𝛼 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡 (1 +
𝜓
1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
 
=
(𝜁𝑊 (1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹
𝛼−1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣) − 1 + (1 − 𝜂)
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝜅𝐹𝑡
𝜅𝐹𝑡
𝛼 (1 + 𝜓1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
 
=
(𝜁𝑊 (1 − 𝛼)𝜅𝐹
𝛼−1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣) − 1 + (1 − 𝜂)
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
) 𝜅𝐹𝑡1−𝛼
(1 + 𝜓1 − 𝜓
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
. 
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Appendix 22. The construct of equation (51) 
Substituting 𝜅𝐸𝑡 by plugging equation (32) into equation (35) yields 
𝑁𝐸𝑡 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝜅𝐸𝑡)
 
𝑁𝐸𝑡 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝜒𝐴𝑡𝜅𝐹((1 − 𝜓)𝜒)
−1𝛼)
 
𝑁𝐸𝑡 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝐴𝑡𝜅𝐹(1 − 𝜓)
−1𝛼𝜒
𝛼−1
𝛼 )
 
𝑁𝐸𝑡 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡
(𝐴𝑡𝜅𝐹(1 − 𝜓)
−1𝛼𝜒−(
1−𝛼
𝛼 ))
. 
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Appendix 23. The construct of equations (52) and (54) 
Substituting equation (27) into equation (40) yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
)(1 + 𝛽−𝜃 (
(1 − 𝜂)𝜌𝐸𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸
)
1−𝜃
)
−1
𝜓𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
Let 𝜃 → 1. In this case: 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) (1 + 𝛽−1)−1𝜓𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) (
𝛽 + 1
𝛽
)
−1
𝜓𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
)𝜓𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡. 
Now, one can observe that the equation is similar to the equation (52) (by the 
use of aggregated equation (13)): 
(52) 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
)(
𝑅𝑙
(𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝐸𝑡)
)𝑚𝑡. 
Next, by continuing the modification of the earlier equation yields 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
)𝜓𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
= (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) 𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 𝜒𝐴𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑡 
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𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝜒𝐴𝑡(1 + 𝑧)𝑁𝐸𝑡(1 + 𝑣)
= (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
) 𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 . 
Next, note that the aggregated capital per effective unit of labor of E firms is 
expressed as in equation (29) as follows: 
 
𝜅𝐸 =
𝐾𝐸
(𝜒𝐴𝐸𝑁𝐸)
. 
Hence 𝜅𝐸+1 is as follows: 
𝜅𝐸𝑡+1 =
𝐾𝐸𝑡+1
𝜒𝐴𝑡(1 + 𝑧)𝑁𝐸𝑡(1 + 𝑣)
. 
Now, by plugging 𝜅𝐸𝑡+1 into the equation yields 
𝜅𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝜌𝑡𝐸
)𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼 . 
Finally, by plugging equation (53) to substitute 𝜌𝑡𝐸  yields the equation (54): 
𝜅𝐸𝑡+1 = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) (
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂(𝛼(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸𝑡
𝛼−1)
)𝜅𝐸𝑡𝛼  
(54) 
𝜅𝐸𝑡+1 =
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
𝑅𝑙
𝑅𝑙 − 𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸𝑡
𝛼−1 𝜅𝐸𝑡
𝛼 . 
 
  
113 
Appendix 24. The construct of equation (56) 
Note that in steady state 𝜅𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝜅𝐸𝑡 = 𝜅𝐸∗  and 𝑅𝑙 = 𝑅. Hence the equation 
(54) is as follows: 
𝜅𝐸∗ = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
)(
𝑅
𝑅 − 𝜂 (𝛼(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸
(∗)𝛼−1)
) 𝜅𝐸
(∗)𝛼  
𝜅𝐸∗ (𝑅 − 𝜂 (𝛼(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸
(∗)𝛼−1)) = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
)𝑅𝜅𝐸
(∗)𝛼  
𝜅𝐸∗𝑅 − 𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)𝜅𝐸
(∗)𝛼 = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
)𝑅𝜅𝐸
(∗)𝛼  
𝜅𝐸
(∗)1−𝛼𝑅 − 𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓) = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
)𝑅 
𝜅𝐸
(∗)1−𝛼𝑅 = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
)𝑅 + 𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓) 
𝜅𝐸
(∗)1−𝛼 = (
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) +
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅
 
𝜅𝐸∗ = [(
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) +
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅
]
1
1−𝛼
. 
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Appendix 25. The construct of equation (57) 
By plugging equation (56) into equation (53) in a steady state yields 
 
𝜌𝐸∗ = 𝛼(1 − 𝜓)([(
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
)
+
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅𝑙
]
1
1−𝛼
)
𝛼−1
 
𝜌𝐸∗ = 𝛼(1 − 𝜓) [(
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) +
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅𝑙
]
𝛼−1
1−𝛼
 
𝜌𝐸∗ = 𝛼(1 − 𝜓) [(
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) +
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅𝑙
]
−(1−𝛼1−𝛼)
 
𝜌𝐸∗ = 𝛼(1 − 𝜓) [(
𝛽
𝛽 + 1
) (
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣)
) +
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅𝑙
]
−1
 
𝜌𝐸∗ =
𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝛽
1 + 𝛽
𝜓
(1 + 𝑧)(1 + 𝑣) +
𝜂𝛼(1 − 𝜓)
𝑅
. 
 
 
